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A NOTE ON LANGUAGE
Person-first language: Person-first language is used to describe
communities affected by a type of disability or oppression.1 For ex-
ample, “incarcerated person” or “person” is used to describe someone
rather than “offender” or “inmate.”2
Gender pronouns: Where the gender-specific pronoun “he” is used,
it refers to a named person or is reflective of the fact that the six
veterans profiled in this writing identify as male.
Veteran: As used in this report, “veteran” refers to any person with
a history of service in the United States military, irrespective of
length of service, combat exposure, or discharge designation.3
Race and capitalization: This Article capitalizes Black and White
as proper nouns when referring to race. This choice reflects the reality
that both terms represent historically created categories. Capitalizing
Black in reference to individuals of African descent acknowledges a
collective identity and a shared history and accords with publishing
standards in institutions predominantly serving Black communities.4
Capitalizing White recognizes Whiteness as a socially constructed
* JD/MSW, New York University.
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1. See People-First Language, EMP’R ASSISTANCE & RES. NETWORK ON DISABILITY
INCLUSION, https://askearn.org/topics/retention-advancement/disability-etiquette/people
-first-language [https://perma.cc/X4BK-BCDS].
2. Eddie Ellis, An Open Letter to Our Friends on the Question of Language, CREDI-
BLEMESSENGERJUST.CTR., https://cmjcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/CNUS-Ap
propriateLanguage.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ2R-4LAJ].
3. Contra 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2021). This is broader than the definition under federal
law. Id. (“Veteran means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service
and who was discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable.”).
4. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black, THE ATLANTIC
(June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize
-blackand-white/613159 [https://perma.cc/4HZX-TAQ4].
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category and avoids portrayal of Whiteness as an objective fact, thus
naturalizing racism.5 “When we ignore the dialectical relation
between the labels ‘black’ and ‘white,’ we treat a bloodstained prod-
uct of history as a neutral, objective fact about the world.”6
Mental disability: The term “mental disability,” where used, em-
braces individuals with experiences of mental illness, intellectual
disability, and/or trauma.7
Intellectual disability: According to the American Association of
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, intellectual disability
refers to, “a disability characterized by significant limitations in
both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers
many everyday social and practical skills. This disability originates
before the age of eighteen.”8
Severe mental illness: While mental illness impacts 20% of Ameri-
cans in a given year, only about 5% of people live with severe mental
illness (SMI).9 SMI refers to a narrow category of conditions that often
last longer than one year and that significantly impact a person’s
ability to conduct daily life activities, such as spending time with fam-
ily or going to work.10 Common diagnoses that fall into this category
5. Id.
6. Id. The National Association of Black Journalists (NABJ) and the American Psycho-
logical Association (APA) likewise capitalize both Black and White. Id.; NABJ Statement
on Capitalizing Black and Other Racial Identifiers, NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK JOURNALISTS
(June 11, 2020), https://www.nabj.org/news/512370/NABJ-Statement-on-Capitalizing
-Black-and-Other-Racial-Identifiers.htm [https://perma.cc/TN7Z-RSE6].
7. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) (“[Any] long-term physical, mental, intel-
lectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”).
8. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM.ASS’N OF INTELLECTUAL&DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, https://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#:~:text=Intellectual
%20disability%20is%20a%20disability,everyday%20social%20and%20practical%20skills
[https://perma.cc/U6A7-7SGB]. In 2010, Congress enacted Rosa’s Law, changing all refer-
ences to “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” in federal law. Rosa’s Law, Pub.
L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010). In 2017, Georgia amended its criminal code in
accordance with Rosa’s Law. HB 343, GA.GEN.ASSEMB., https://www.legis.ga.gov/legisla
tion/50486 [https://perma.cc/3Y36-ZCC4] (outlining how this code section substitutes the
term “intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded” and “mental retardation”); see, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2020).
9. RACHEL N. LIPARI & EUNICE PARK-LEE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED
STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 2 (2019),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHNationalFindings
Report2018/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX2V-QWTB].
10. Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders, SUBSTANCEABUSE&MENTALHEALTH
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include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).11 Individuals with SMI might hear
voices, orient differently to time or place, remember things differently,
hold fears or beliefs that others do not share, experience powerful
emotions, or live with thoughts of suicide or self-harm.12 No single
factor causes SMI, but a person’s family history, structural adversity,
and past traumatic experiences all play a role.13 Factors such as
structural racism and socioeconomic inequality both increase the risk
of SMI and limit access to recovery-oriented care; research docu-
ments that Black people living with SMI experience forced treatment,
involuntary hospitalization, physical restraint, and unwanted contact
with the legal system at higher rates than their similarly situated
White peers.14 In the past, psychiatrists believed that people with SMI
could not recover, and thus “treatment” involved confinement to the
SERVS.ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/find-help/disorders [https://perma
.cc/X6DE-MXNN]; see also Marc Corbie re, Patrizia Villotti, Tania Lecomte, Gary R. Bond,
Alain Lesage & Elliot M. Goldner, Work Accommodations and Natural Supports for Main-
taining Employment, 37 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J. 90, 90–91 (2014) (arguing that while
people with SMI experience high unemployment rates and short job tenure, they can and
do perform in the workplace given access to accommodations); LeRoy Spaniol & Ann
Nelson, Family Recovery, 51 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 761, 761 (2015) (“The onset of a
mental illness is a traumatic experience for all members of a family.”).
11. TAMMEKA SWINSON EVANS, NANCY BERKMAN, CARRIE BROWN, BRADLEY GAYNES
& RACHEL PALMIERI WEBER, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, DISPARITIES
WITHIN SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 7–8, 17 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books
/NBK368427/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK368427.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E4W-Z66N] (indicating
that experiences with SMI vary from person to person, even within the same diagnosis,
and factors such as race, poverty, and access to care influence a person’s trajectory of re-
covery; plus, not everyone who receives a diagnosis of SMI identifies with that diagnosis).
12. See, e.g., HEALING VOICES (Digital Eyes Film 2016) (depicting three individuals
living with SMI who share experiences commonly stigmatized as “psychosis” and further-
more examining America’s broken mental health system).
13. See Cherise Rosen, Nev Jones, Eleanor Longden, Kayla A. Chase, Mona Shattell,
Jennifer K. Melbourne, Sarah K. Keedy & Rajiv P. Sharma, Exploring the Intersections
of Trauma, Structural Adversity, and Psychosis Among a Primarily African-American
Sample: A Mixed-Methods Analysis, FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, Apr. 2017, at 1, 1–2.
14. See James Y. Nazroo, Kamaldeep S. Bhui & James Rhodes, Where Next for Under-
standing Race/Ethnic Inequalities in Severe Mental Illness? Structural, Interpersonal, and
Institutional Racism, 42 SOCIO. HEALTH & ILLNESS 262, 262–63, 270 (2020) (explaining
that factors such as structural racism, collective racial trauma, structural socioeconomic
adversity, and childhood trauma all increase a person’s risk of SMI and impact a person’s
subsequent trajectory of recovery; Black people with SMI face higher risk of negative con-
tact with the prison system and coercive psychiatric treatment); Michael L. Perlin &
Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Tolling For the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”:
The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability
Law Policing Rape Complaints, 20 J.GENDER,RACE &JUST. 431, 439–40, 450 (2017) (ex-
plaining that irrespective of disability severity, Black people with mental disabilities
experience involuntary commitment, involuntary administration of antipsychotics, misdiag-
nosis, substandard treatment, and clinician/court findings of “dangerousness” at higher
rates than White people with the same disabilities).
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state mental hospital.15 We now know that people with SMI can and
do live full lives in their communities.16
Trauma: The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin-
istration defines trauma as “an event, series of events, or set of cir-
cumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically or
emotionally harmful or life threatening and that has lasting adverse
effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical, social,
emotional, or spiritual well-being.”17 Trauma may be endemic in in-
stitutions, such as psychiatric hospitals or prisons, where these insti-
tutions repeatedly expose people confined within them to abuses
such as involuntary treatment, restraint, excessive force, or solitary
confinement.18 Trauma also includes experiences of chronic adver-
sity, such as poverty or racism.19 Trauma alters the body’s biological
response to stress; it profoundly impacts normal human processes,
such as memory, concentration, emotional expression, the formation
and maintenance of intimate relationships, and responses to real or
perceived threats.20
Historical trauma:
[H]istorical trauma is the “cumulative emotional and psychologi-
cal wounding over a lifespan and across generations, emanating
from massive group experiences” . . . “[A] person whose culture
of origin has a history of oppression or genocide may be living
with effects of trauma exposure that occurred not to the individ-
ual but [instead] to their forebearers.”21
15. See, e.g., MABSEGREST, ADMINISTRATIONS OF LUNACY:RACISM AND THE HAUNTING
OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AT THE MILLEDGEVILLE ASYLUM (2020) (explaining, through
an in-depth case study of Georgia’s Milledgeville State Hospital, how the South’s history
of slavery and racism influenced the development of the psychiatric asylum, the forced
hospitalization of individuals reporting experiences labeled psychosis, and the over-
institutionalization of Black people); Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 14, at 447 (acknowledg-
ing the legacy of racial segregation in southern psychiatric institutions).
16. See Mark Ragins & David A. Pollack, Recovery and Community Mental Health,
in MODERN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, 385, 392
(Kenneth Yeager, David Cutler, Dale Svendsen & Grayce M. Sills eds., 2013) (outlining
a recovery-based approach to care for SMI).
17. Trauma and Violence, SUBSTANCEABUSE &MENTALHEALTHSERVS.ADMIN. (Aug. 2,
2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/trauma-violence [https://perma.cc/TS3S-U7P2].
18. See id.
19. Kevin L. Nadal, Tanya Erazo & Rukiya King, Challenging Definitions of Psycholog-
ical Trauma: Connecting Racial Microaggressions and Traumatic Stress, J.SOC.ACTION
COUNSELING & PSYCH., Winter 2019, at 2, 3, 11 (2019).
20. See BESSEL A. VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE:BRAIN,MIND, AND BODY
IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA 1–2, 21 (2014).
21. Kristin N. Williams-Washington & Chmaika P. Mills, African American Historical
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Racial trauma: Current diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) fail to capture the reality of racial trauma, which
results from the cumulative impact of chronic exposure to racism
(overt, covert, and systemic).22 Additionally, many clinicians and
scholars conceptualize the negative mental health impact of racism
through a historical trauma lens, defining African American histori-
cal trauma as, “the collective spiritual, psychological, emotional, and
cognitive distress perpetuated intergenerationally deriving from
multiple denigrating experiences originating with slavery and
continuing with pattern forms of racism and discrimination to the
present day.”23
Trauma-informed: Trauma-informed capital defense lawyering
requires: (i) understanding the prevalence of trauma as a public
health issue, understanding the relevance of traumatic experiences in
shaping an individual’s story, and conducting an investigation re-
sponsive to these realities; (ii) building relationships with clients in
a manner that actively resists re-traumatization; and (iii) presenting
a narrative that honors both the impact of trauma and the person’s
resilience.24 Specifically, defense teams must: (i) develop a comprehen-
sive life and history through a variety of sources,25 and (ii) prioritize
Trauma: Creating an Inclusive Measure, 46 J. MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING &DEV.246,
247 (2018) (citations omitted).
22. Nadal et al., supra note 19, at 3–4; see also Della V. Mosley, Candice N. Hargons,
Carolyn Meiller, Blanka Angyal, Paris Wheeler, Candice Davis & Danelle Stevens-
Watkins, Critical Consciousness of Anti-Black Racism: A Practical Model to Prevent and
Resist Racial Trauma, 68 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 1, 1 (2021) (“Racial trauma, also referred
to as race-based traumatic stress, is the psychological, emotional, and physical injury from
experiencing real and perceived racism. Racial trauma accounts for experiences of racism
inclusive of overt (e.g., use of racial slurs) and covert (e.g., exclusion based on assump-
tions of racial inferiority) interpersonal discrimination and harassment, as well as in-
stitutional and systemic racism (e.g., systemic excessive use of force by the police).”
(citations omitted)).
23. Williams-Washington & Mills, supra note 21, at 247; see also Jocelyn R. Smith
Lee & Michael A. Robinson, “That’s My Number One Fear in Life. It’s the Police”: Examin-
ing Young Black Men’s Exposures to Trauma and Loss Resulting from Police Violence
and Police Killings, 45 J.BLACK PSYCH. 143, 144–45 (2019) (discussing the ways that the
historical relationship between police brutality and racial terror lynching should inform
clinical research on the mental health impact of police killings in Black communities).
24. Miriam S. Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal
Defense Can Reform Sentencing, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2, 5, 36, 38 (2018).
25. 2008 Guideline 10.11, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/resources/aba_guidelines/2008
-supplementary-guidelines/2008-guideline-10-11 [https://perma.cc/ZKX9-J95N] (“The
investigation into a client’s life history must survey a broad set of sources and includes,
but is not limited to: medical history; complete prenatal, pediatric and adult health in-
formation; exposure to harmful substances in utero and in the environment; substance
abuse history; mental health history; history of maltreatment and neglect; trauma history;
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physical and emotional safety, trust and transparency, personal
agency, and mutuality in relationships with clients and families.26
INTRODUCTION
I. A PROFILE OF GEORGE PORTER AND SIX VETERANS EXECUTED








II. BLACK GEORGIANS AND GEORGIANS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES FACE A HEIGHTENED RISK OF EXECUTION
A. Black Georgians Face a Heightened Risk of Execution
B. Georgians with Mental Disabilities Face a Heightened
Risk of Execution
III. PORTER PROMISES PROTECTION FOR BLACK VETERANS AND
VETERANS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
APPENDIX I: RECORD EXCERPTS
APPENDIX II: CASE PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Court decided a capital post-conviction case involv-
ing a Korean War veteran.27 George Porter served his country on the
front lines of a gruesome war.28 He enlisted in the military to escape
family violence and other challenges that he faced in childhood.29 In
Korea, he began to struggle with traumatic distress; these struggles
educational history; employment and training history; military experience; multigenera-
tional family history, genetic disorders and vulnerabilities, as well as multigenerational
patterns of behavior; prior adult and juvenile correctional experience; religious, gender,
sexual orientation, ethnic, racial, cultural and community influences; socioeconomic,
historical, and political factors.”).
26. Megan Leschak, Soc. Work Supervisor, N.M. L. Offices of the Pub. Def., Presenta-
tion at the 2019 National Alliance of Sentencing Advocates and Mitigation Specialists
(NASAMS) Conference: Trauma Informed Defense Teams and Restorative Practices
(June 4, 2019) (explaining that trauma-informed mitigation work requires: ensuring
maximum physical and emotional safety within institutional constraints, being transparent
and trustworthy, maximizing personal choice, adopting a collaborative approach, and
taking every opportunity to acknowledge the person’s growth and resilience).
27. Porter v. McCollum (Porter II), 558 U.S. 30, 30–31 (2009).
28. Id. at 34–35.
29. Id. at 33–34.
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escalated when he returned home.30 The Court found that George
Porter’s trial counsel failed to present his full story to the Florida jury
that sentenced him to death.31 The Supreme Court found especially
unreasonable counsel’s failure to present evidence of military service,
given the unique potential of this evidence to engender empathy.32
Despite the Porter court’s reference to a “long tradition of accord-
ing leniency to veterans,” in the criminal legal system, veterans are
overrepresented on death rows across America, including Georgia’s.33
Most of these veterans come to death row with experiences of mar-
ginalization due to other aspects of their identity, such as race or
mental disability.34
This Article examines the cases of six men executed in Georgia,
each with a history of military service, and each with experiences of
disenfranchisement based on race and/or mental disability. At trial,
each confronted legal risks that disproportionately place Black people
and people with mental disabilities in danger of execution. In no
case did a trial attorney present meaningful evidence of military
service to a jury. The State of Georgia executed all six men between
1994 and 2016.
The decision to join the military is different for each person.
When choosing to serve, some people reflect on collective values of
patriotism, duty, honor, and sacrifice. As Vietnam veteran Andrew
Brannan explained, “I’m very proud, from a military family. We’ve
always done our duty by our country . . . .”35 For Americans with
experiences of marginalization based on race and/or mental disabil-
ity, the structured, merit-based environment of the military offers
a new opportunity to succeed. Warren Lee Hill, a Georgia native, grew
up amidst violence and poverty, and he experienced discrimination
30. Id. at 35–36.
31. Id. at 42–44.
32. Id. at 43–44.
33. Porter II, 558 U.S. at 43; see Mark Berman, One in 10 Death Row Inmates Are
Military Veterans, Report Says, WASH.POST (Nov. 10, 2015, 9:29 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/11/10/one-in-10-death-row-inmates-are-mili
tary-veterans-report-says [https://perma.cc/CQ4U-7GDW].
34. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: TARGETING BLACK VETERANS 39
(2017), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/lynching-in-america-targeting-black
-veterans-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BE-GKV6] (explaining that only 7% of Americans
serve in the military, but an estimated 10% of persons on death row are veterans).
35. Special Neuropsychiatric Examination of Andrew H. Brannan at VA Med. Ctr.,
in Decatur, Ga. (Oct. 19, 1984) (on file with author). Mr. Brannan submitted hundreds
of mental health records as mitigating evidence at his capital trial, which the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed on direct appeal. See VA Mental Health Progress Notes of
Andrew H. Brannan (on file with author). These citations refer to Veterans Affairs psy-
chiatric evaluations and mental health progress notes dating from 1984 to 1995. See id.;
Neuropsychiatric Examination of Andrew H. Brannan at VA Med. Ctr., in Decatur, Ga.
(on file with author).
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due to his status as Black man with an intellectual disability.36 In the
words of his older sister, he joined the Navy to “escape.”37 Escape he
did, rising through the naval ranks to E5–Petty Officer Second Class.38
However, for some Black service members and service members
with mental disabilities, military life reproduces broader societal in-
equities.39 In extreme cases, Black veterans and veterans with mental
disabilities face an elevated risk of criminalization and extreme pun-
ishment after they return to civilian life.40 A disproportionate number
of Black veterans and veterans with mental disabilities populate
death rows across America, including Georgia’s.41 Fifty percent of
men on Georgia’s death row are Black.42 Five hundred thirty-one
veterans currently live under a life, life without parole (LWOP), or
death sentence in Georgia.43 Over 50% of the people that Georgia
executed between 2001 and 2015 lived with mental disabilities.44
36. Hicks Aff. ¶¶ 2–3, 5–9, C.788–91, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga.
2003) (on file with author); Porter Aff. ¶¶ 2–3, C.796–98, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E.
2d 613 (Ga. 2003) (on file with author).
37. Scott Aff. ¶¶ 2, 23, C.860–71, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003)
(on file with author).
38. O’Bryant Aff. ¶ 13, C.806–14, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003) (on
file with author). Mr. Hill submitted hundreds of pages of affidavits from family members,
teachers, and fellow service members when he petitioned the State of Georgia for habeas
relief. See, e.g., Hicks Aff., supra note 36, ¶¶ 2–3; O’Bryant Aff., supra, ¶ 2; Scott Aff.,
supra note 37, ¶ 2. In particular, Mr. Hill’s siblings Peggy, Robbie, and Chester, and his
mother Joanne Hill, submitted testimony describing family life during Mr. Hill’s child-
hood. C. Hill Aff. ¶¶ 2–3, 6, C.853–59, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003)
(on file with author); J. Hill Aff. ¶¶ 3, 7–8, 10–12, C.832–46, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587
S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003) (on file with author); Scott Aff., supra note 37, ¶¶ 7–10, 22–25;
Williams Aff. ¶¶ 1–7, 11–18, C.818–31, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003)
(on file with author). The Supreme Court of Georgia retains a copy of these records.
39. See Alison J. Lynch, Veterans on Death Row: Strategies for Mitigating Capital
Sentences for Defendants with Military Service History, AM.BARASS’N, SEC. CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 2018, at 4, 7 (explaining that service members with mental disabilities are
differentially impacted by common stressors of military life, such as deployment, relocation,
or the loss of close friends); Evan Seamone, Shoba Sreenivasan, James McGuire, Dan
Smee, Sean Clark & Daniel Dow, A Rehabilitative Justice Pathway for War-Traumatized
Offenders Caught in the Military Misconduct Catch-22, 44 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 139,
140–41 (2017) (describing the military’s punitive responses to mental disability); EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 34, at 7–8 (explaining that Black service members his-
torically experienced racism while in the military, and upon return to civilian life).
40. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 34, at 7, 39; Seamone et al., supra note 39,
at 144–45.
41. SeeGA.DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE STATISTICAL PROFILE:INMATE VALIDATED
VETERANS 5, 19, 32, 39 (2020), http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/sites/all/themes/gdc/pdf/Pro
file_all_veterans_2020_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/73HB-69KS].
42. DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.:
WINTER2020,48–49 (2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSAWinter
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U57B-FFJK].
43. GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 41, at 32.
44. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Marty Davidson, Kaneesha R. Johnson, Arvind
Krishnamurthy & Colin P. Wilson, Data and Resources, DEADLY JUST. (2017), available
at https://fbaum.unc.edu/books/DeadlyJustice/MentalIllness.xlsx.
2021] FULFILLING PORTER’S PROMISE 773
The Court clarified in Porter that military service carries miti-
gating weight even and perhaps especially when the veteran on trial
falls outside the popular image of the “American hero.”45 Through
case studies of the six Georgia veterans sentenced to death, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that: (i) many veterans share experiences of disen-
franchisement based on race and/or mental disability, and (ii) when
charged capitally, these veterans face heightened risk of execution,
as the death penalty system targets people with these experiences.
The Article concludes with a call to defense counsel to adopt mitiga-
tion strategies responsive to the heightened risk of execution that
Black veterans and veterans with mental disabilities face. Only
through such strategies may counsel effectuate Porter’s promise to
protect veterans from the death penalty.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the case of Mr.
George Porter, as well as the cases of six death-sentenced Georgia
veterans: Andrew Brannan, William Hance, Warren Hill, Travis
Hittson, Brandon Jones, and Marcus Wellons. This section highlights
the ways that the veterans’ experiences with racism and/or mental
disability placed them at elevated risk of execution at the sentenc-
ing phase of their capital trials. Part II highlights the unique risks
that Black Georgians and Georgians with mental disabilities face in
the death penalty system. Part III examines the Porter decision it-
self, arguing that the Court’s ruling applies with special force to
veterans with histories of marginalization. Accordingly, this section
urges capital defense counsel to rely on Porter in adopting strategies
for mitigation responsive to both military service history and life-
course experiences of racism and mental disability.
I. A PROFILE OF GEORGE PORTER AND SIX VETERANS
EXECUTED BY THE STATE OF GEORGIA
After presenting a brief introduction to the case of George Porter,
this section reviews the cases of six Black veterans and veterans
with mental disabilities, executed by the State of Georgia between
1994 and 2016: Andrew Brannan, William Hance, Warren Hill, Jr.,
Travis Hittson, Brandon Jones, and Marcus Wellons. The case sum-
maries focus on risks that each veteran faced at the capital sentencing
stage, based on race and/or mental disability. Through life narratives,
the summaries also depict the military and mental health mitiga-
tion evidence that defense counsel failed to present at trial.
Case descriptions reflect an analysis of decisions and filings
available on Westlaw and PACER. In three cases—Andrew Brannan,
Warren Hill, and Travis Hittson—case summaries also incorporate
45. Porter v. McCollum (Porter II), 588 U.S. 30, 41–44 (2009).
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portions of direct appeal and state post-conviction records on file
with the Clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court. Appendix I provides
record excerpts from these three cases, drawing on quotes that high-
light each veteran’s intersecting experiences with racism, mental
disability, and military service.46 These excerpts also offer a sam-
pling of the wealth of mitigation information available in each case;
information that capital jurors did not evaluate before sentencing each
man to death.47 Also, in the cases of Andrew Brannan, Warren Hill,
Jr., and Travis Hittson, narrative sections include photos obtained
with permission from the Georgia Resource Center, the 501(c)(3) law
office that represented each of these three men in state and federal
post-conviction litigation.48
Finally, Appendix II provides a condensed procedural history
for each veteran, beginning with the automatic review of the death
sentence on direct appeal in the Georgia Supreme Court and con-
cluding with execution at Georgia Diagnostic and Classification
Prison (GDCP).49
A. George Porter
A Brevard County, Florida, court sentenced Mr. George Porter
to death in 1988, after a jury convicted him of killing his former lover
and her new partner.50 The trial court that sentenced Mr. Porter to
death never learned about his history of childhood trauma, his ex-
periences with mental disability, or the harsh conditions that he
endured and the courage that he displayed while serving overseas.51
Multiple generations of Mr. Porter’s family struggled with exces-
sive drinking, and Mr. Porter’s father beat his mother severely when
he was drunk.52 George Porter witnessed these assaults and tried to
intervene on his mother’s behalf, but he soon became his father’s
“favorite target” due to his learning disability.53 Evidence introduced
46. See infra App. I.
47. See infra App. I.
48. See GA.RES.CTR., https://www.garesource.org [https://perma.cc/BZ5X-3T7J] (“The
Georgia Appellate Practice & Educational Resource Center (‘Georgia Resource Center’) is
a 501(c)(3) non-profit law office established in 1988 to provide free, high quality representa-
tion to people on Georgia’s death row, in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings
challenging their capital convictions and death sentences . . . .”).
49. See infra App. II. Georgia has conducted executions at GDCP since 1983. GA.
DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, OFF. OF PLAN. & ANALYSIS, A HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN GEORGIA: EXECUTIONS BY YEAR 1924–2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.dcor.state.ga.us
/sites/all/files/pdf/Research/Standing/Death_penalty_in_Georgia.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6ETD-DP7Y].
50. See Porter v. State (Porter I), 564 So. 2d 1060, 1061–62 (Fla. 1990).
51. See Porter v. McCollum (Porter II), 558 U.S. 30, 33 (2009).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 33–34.
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years later, in Mr. Porter’s post-conviction proceedings, linked his
disability—he struggled with “reading, writing, and memory”—to
differences in the structure of his brain.54 The schools that Mr. Porter
attended failed to accommodate his learning needs, and he dropped
out by the age of thirteen.55 At age seventeen, he enlisted in the mili-
tary, bringing his childhood experiences with him.56
In Korea, Mr. Porter fought on the front lines of two gruesome
battles.57 He sustained a gunshot wound, and 50% of his unit lost their
lives on the battlefield.58 The soldiers in Mr. Porter’s unit endured
extreme conditions: lack of food, lack of sleep, and extreme cold.59
The army awarded Mr. Porter two Purple Hearts for his service.60
Eventually, combat began to take its toll, and Mr. Porter started
to exhibit signs of traumatic distress.61 He went absent without leave
(AWOL) more than once during his time in Korea.62 After returning
home, Mr. Porter’s drinking escalated, as he struggled to find a way
to soothe the war-related nightmares that kept him awake at night.63
As Mr. Porter’s mental health deteriorated, his family removed sharp
objects from the home to keep him safe.64 Soon, Mr. Porter’s distress
began to affect his relationships.65 His partner left him, and Mr.
Porter felt isolated and alone.66 His crime of conviction occurred just
three months after this tumultuous breakup.67
The Florida trial court heard no evidence of Mr. Porter’s child-
hood trauma, his learning disability, the grueling conditions he en-
countered on the battlefield, or the distress that overwhelmed him at
the time of the crime.68 In 2009, on federal habeas review, the Su-
preme Court found that George Porter’s trial counsel failed to present
sufficient mitigating evidence to the Brevard County court that sen-
tenced him to death.69 The Court found especially unreasonable
counsel’s failure to present evidence of military service, given the
unique potential of this evidence to engender empathy.70
54. Id. at 36, 41.
55. See id. at 33–34.
56. Id. at 34.
57. Porter II, 588 U.S. at 34–35.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 35.
61. See id. at 35.
62. Id. at 35.
63. See Porter II, 588 U.S. at 35–36.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 41, 43.
66. See id. at 31.
67. Id. at 31–32.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Porter II, 588 U.S. at 30–32, 44.
70. See id. at 43–44.
776 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:765
B. Andrew Brannan
71
A Laurens County jury sentenced Mr. Andrew Brannan to death
in 2000 after convicting him of killing Laurens County Deputy
Sheriff Kyle Dinkheller during a traffic stop.72 At the time of the
killing, Veterans Affairs (VA) medical records classified Mr. Brannan
as 100% disabled due to PTSD.73 One week before the fatal traffic
stop, he stopped taking the medications that he used, along with
psychotherapy, to manage his PTSD.74 The Laurens County traffic
stop triggered a wartime flashback, and Mr. Brannan’s mind and
body sent him into survival mode.75 In an outburst of violence, he
took Deputy Dinkheller’s life.76
Trial counsel did not present testimony from Mr. Brannan’s treat-
ing psychiatrist at the Decatur, Georgia VA PTSD unit.77 Nor did
trial counsel present testimony from veterans who served alongside
Mr. Brannan in Vietnam.78 The only real evidence that counsel pre-
sented in mitigation consisted of Mr. Brannan’s mother, who spoke
about his military and mental health records directly to the jury.79
71. Image source: The Georgia Resource Center.
72. See Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561 S.E.2d 414, 418–19, 429 n.1 (Ga. 2002).
73. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 6, Brannan v. Humphrey, 573 U.S. 906
(2014) (No. 13-1220), 2014 WL 1389015.
74. See id. at 27–28.
75. See Brannan II, 561 S.E.2d at 419.
76. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 2; Brief for Ga. Mil. Officers
Ass’n of America, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, 12, Brannan v.
Humphrey, 573 U.S. 906 (2014) (No. 13-1220), 2014 WL 1912095 [hereinafter Brief for
Ga. Mil. Officers Ass’n].
77. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 6–7.
78. Id. at 9–10.
79. See id. at 9, 18.
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Accordingly, the jury that sentenced Mr. Brannan to death lacked an
understanding of the severity of the trauma that he endured in
combat.80 The jury also did not hear evidence documenting Mr.
Brannan’s history of successful treatment, evidence that would coun-
teract narratives of future dangerousness and accurately contextual-
ize his crime of conviction as an aberration.81
Mr. Brannan graduated from West Georgia College and became
an officer and platoon leader in the United States Army.82 He came
from a long line of veterans; every male member of his immediate
family served.83 In 1970, at the age of twenty-one, the army sent Mr.
Brannan to Vietnam.84 He led his platoon on reconnaissance mis-
sions amidst sniper fire, rarely slept, saw heavy combat, and earned
a Bronze Star for his service.85
After returning home to Georgia, Mr. Brannan struggled to
reintegrate into the civilian world.86 He found it difficult to secure
and hold down a job.87 Though grateful for family support, he felt
that he never measured up to the expectations of his father, a re-
tired lieutenant colonel who served in WWII.88 After his brother,
also a Vietnam veteran, died by suicide in 1984, Mr. Brannan sought
help for his own traumatic distress.89 In therapy sessions, he rumi-
nated on how close he came to killing Vietnamese soldiers and
civilians.90 As an officer, he felt responsible for placing other soldiers
in harm’s way.91 He experienced survivor’s guilt and reported recur-
rent flashbacks to witnessing the death of a superior officer in a
land mine explosion.92 The burden of serving in a gruesome and un-
popular war weighed heavily on him.93 For sixteen years, he re-
ceived ongoing treatment for PTSD from the VA Medical Center in
80. See id. at 18–19, 23–24.
81. See id. at 10, 28–29.
82. See id. at 2–3; Dr. Storms Trial Tr. at 575, Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561
S.E.2d 414 (Ga. 2002).
83. Andrew Brannan: The Execution of a Decorated Veteran with Serious Mental
Illness, GA.RES.CTR., https://www.garesource.org/cases/andrew-brannan [https://perma
.cc/5LAE-UVUV].
84. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 3; Special Neuropsychiatric
Examination of Andrew H. Brannan at VA Med. Ctr., in Decatur, Ga. (Oct. 19, 1984) (on
file with author).
85. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 3–4.
86. See id. at 4–5.
87. See Special Neuropsychiatric Examination of Andrew H. Brannan at VA Med.




91. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 3–4, 6–7.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 3–4, 6, 22.
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Decatur, Georgia, and spent several months hospitalized at the Cen-
ter’s inpatient PTSD unit.94
At trial, District Attorney Ralph Walke excluded venire persons
familiar with PTSD—a mental health nurse and a twenty-one-year
Marine Corps veteran who served in Vietnam—from Mr. Brannan’s
jury.95 He then (i) minimized the trauma that Mr. Brannan endured
in Vietnam and its lasting impact by arguing that he feigned PTSD
to receive disability compensation, and (ii) relied on “trained killer”
stereotypes to link Mr. Brannan’s combat PTSD to a proclivity to
commit violence in prison:
Vietnam had not one thing in the world to do with this murder . . .
That is a flimsy, sorry, no-good stinking excuse . . . He’s a disgrace
to our veterans when he walks in here and says, I did it because
of Vietnam. I did it because I’m a veteran. Don’t listen to that . . .
He was drawing close to two thousand dollars a month as he
walked around talking about I’m depressed, I don’t feel good.96
Does Andrew Brannan need to be sentenced to life in the peni-
tentiary so he’ll have a lifetime of laying in his bunk at night and
breaking apart razors and figuring out some way when a deputy
walks up or a jailer walks up that he can take him one of these
razor blades and do some slashing? . . . Andrew Brannan is a
dangerous man. He’s murdered one deputy sheriff and it won’t
be hard for a combat-trained veteran to . . . do it again . . . you
can put him in there and those guards and those prisoners, they
are going to have to be living with him. And when he don’t [sic]
like the way something’s going, he waits and he strikes . . . .97
Absent testimony from fellow veterans corroborating the trauma
that Mr. Brannan sustained on the battlefield, the State’s minimiza-
tion of his combat trauma stood unrefuted.98 Similarly, the absence
94. See id. at 5–7.
95. See Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561 S.E.2d 414, 418, 422 (Ga. 2002).
96. Trial Tr., Brannan v. State (Brannan I), Laurens Super. Ct. Case No. 98-FE-438-
T (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 2000) (on file with Georgia Research Center); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 10, 15.
97. See Brief of Cross-Appellant at 43–45, 48–49, Brannan v. Hall (Brennan V), 670
S.E.2d 87 (Ga. 2008).
98. See Brief for Ga. Mil. Officers Ass’n, supra note 76, at 26 (“Had [Mr.] Brannan’s
counsel performed a sufficient investigation and called Brannan’s comrades to testify, the
jury would have heard first-hand accounts of [Mr.] Brannan’s front-line combat experience.
For example, the jury would have heard of how [Mr.] Brannan was a Lieutenant who led
a five-man reconnaissance team, serving as an artillery forward observer, tracking the
location of the enemy, and used a radio to call in grid coordinates. The jury would have
also heard first-hand accounts of the traumatic events leading to [Mr.] Brannan’s PTSD,
such as the horror and haunting details of the patrol in which the company commander
stepped on a land mine. A fellow veteran’s graphic description of the land mine event
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of mental health expert testimony on Mr. Brannan’s sustained prog-
ress in treatment and available, evidence-based interventions for
PTSD allowed the State to portray Mr. Brannan’s trauma as “un-
treatable” and a predictor of future violence.99 The jury voted for
death.100 After fifteen years of litigation, the State of Georgia exe-
cuted Mr. Brannan on January 13, 2015.101
C. William Hance
A Muscogee County jury convicted William Hance of killing Gail
Faison, a sex worker, and sentenced him to death.102 In 1978, while
stationed at Fort Benning in Georgia, Mr. Hance met Gail Faison at
a bar near the Army base.103 As the two left the bar together, Ms.
Faison propositioned Mr. Hance for sex and began to undress.104 In
response, Mr. Hance “flipped.”105 The interaction may have triggered
memories of watching the rape of his younger sister and learning of
the rape of his mother.106 His past experiences with sexual trauma
overwhelmed him, and he reacted violently, ultimately taking Ms.
Faison’s life.107 The Eleventh Circuit overturned Mr. Hance’s death
sentence in 1983 after the court found that the prosecutor’s closing
argument impermissibly appealed to the race-based “fears and
emotions” of the jury, thereby depriving Mr. Hance of a fair trial.108
A resentencing jury again imposed a death sentence, and the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed.109
During Mr. Hance’s first capital trial, the State used almost all
of its peremptory strikes to exclude Black venire persons from the
jury.110 Defense counsel presented no mitigating evidence, and jurors
never learned about Mr. Hance’s honorable discharge from the
and his statement that ‘I can still remember the smell of [the Captain’s] burning flesh,’
would have distinguished [Mr.] Brannan’s trauma from the problems that the prosecutor
argued we all have. It also would have served as a strong antidote to the prosecutor’s
argument that, despite a VA classification as 100 percent disabled, Andrew Brannan was
a malingerer who ‘had to work’ to get his disability.”).
99. See Brief of Cross-Appellant, supra note 97, at 7–8, 47–48.
100. See Brannan II, 561 S.E.2d at 418.
101. Id. at 418 n.1; Andrew Brannan,DEATH PENALTYINFO.CTR., https://deathpenaltyin
fo.org/executions/execution-database/1395/andrew-brannan [https://perma.cc/XV9B-4ZCG].
102. Hance v. State (Hance I), 268 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1980).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Hance v. Kemp (Hance VII), 373 S.E.2d 184, 188 (Ga. 1988).
106. See id. at 188–89.
107. See id. at 189.
108. Hance v. Zant (Hance IV), 696 F.2d 940, 951–53 (11th Cir. 1983), overruled by
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (1985).
109. Hance v. State (Hance V), 332 S.E.2d 287, 289, 292 (Ga. 1985).
110. See Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial at 9, State v. Gates
(2019) (No. SU-75-CR-38335).
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United States Marine Corps, his service in the Army, his exposure
to sexual trauma in childhood, or the race-based trauma impacting
the Black community in Columbus, Georgia, at the time of his prose-
cution.111 Rather than present this narrative to the resentencing
jury, defense counsel in Mr. Hance’s second death penalty trial in-
stead presented mental health experts who offered a series of diag-
noses that tended to pathologize and dehumanize Mr. Hance.112 Two
jurors in this second trial admitted to using racial slurs during
sentencing deliberations.113 Mr. Hance survived profound trauma in
childhood.114 His mother, who lived with a disability, worked two
jobs to provide for the family.115 His stepfather drank heavily and
became angry when intoxicated.116 As a child, Mr. Hance witnessed
his stepfather beat his mother.117 Mr. Hance’s stepfather also physi-
cally and psychologically abused the children.118 At age six, his step-
father raped his nine-year-old sister, forcing Mr. Hance to watch.119
In 1972, Mr. Hance lost his mother—his primary source of support
and protection in childhood—to a brutal rape and murder.120 Law
enforcement never identified the person responsible.121 The incident
devastated Mr. Hance.122
As a young adult, Mr. Hance enlisted in the Marines to help his
mother provide for his family, serving for four years and earning an
honorable discharge.123 Less than a year later, he enlisted in the Army,
taking on extra duty to provide for his own wife and children.124
An atmosphere of racial terror gripped Fort Benning and the
City of Columbus in the years surrounding Mr. Hance’s arrest and
trial.125 Between 1977 and 1978, the city learned of the rape and
111. See Hance VII, 373 S.E.2d at 188, 190; James T. Wooten, Racial Tensions in
Columbus, Ga., Bring City to the Brink of Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 1971),
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/27/archives/racial-tensions-in-columbus-ga-bring-city
-to-the-brink-of.html [https://perma.cc/2WQ6-GL7Y].
112. See Hance VII, 373 S.E.2d at 189.
113. See Hance v. Zant (Hance X), 511 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that Mr. Hance’s “trial and sentencing proceedings were infected with racial
prejudice”); see also Stephen B. Bright, Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices and
Challenges for American’s Future, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845, 855 (1996); Bob Herbert,
In America; Jury Room Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at A15.
114. See Hance VII, 373 S.E.2d at 188–89.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 189.
117. See id. at 188–89.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 189.





125. See David Rose, My Bid to Clear an Innocent Death Row Prisoner: How Reporter
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murder of seven White female residents.126 The local chapter of the
Ku Klux Klan began patrolling Columbus at night, seeking ven-
geance for these deaths.127 The Columbus Police Department and
the Fort Benning Military Police interrogated over 100 young Black
men as pressure mounted to arrest and convict someone.128 Over a
decade after Mr. Hance’s trial, a Muscogee County jury convicted
Mr. Carlton Gary, a Black Columbus resident, of three of the kill-
ings.129 In March 2018, the State of Georgia was set to execute Mr.
Carlton Gary, despite compelling evidence of his actual innocence
of these crimes.130 Media coverage of this era in Columbus history
likens the White community’s response to the retributive urgency
characteristic of racial terror lynchings.131 Gary Parker, the attorney
who represented Mr. Hance in clemency proceedings before the
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, described the capital prose-
cution and execution of Mr. Hance as “cousin to a lynching.”132
During the late 1970s, Mr. Hance moved to Columbus and con-
tinued his military service at Fort Benning, conscious of the risks
that he faced as a young Black man in a racially charged atmo-
sphere.133 The danger wore on him.134 In early 1978, he wrote a
series of letters to the Columbus Police, in which he identified him-
self as the leader of a White vigilante group, the “Forces of Evil,”
and threatened to take Black women hostage as retribution for the
killings of local White women.135 The content of these letters raised
questions about Mr. Hance’s deteriorating mental state at the time
of Gail Faison’s death.136
As the White community in Columbus, with the aid of law en-
forcement, terrorized Black residents, the county’s court system
Went to Court to Prove Convicted U.S. Murderer Could Not Have Killed Seven Women




126. Id.; Gary v. State, 389 S.E.2d 218, 219 (Ga. 1990).
127. See Rose, supra note 125.
128. See id.
129. Gary, 389 S.E.2d at 219; Hance v. State (Hance I), 268 S.E.2d 339, 339 (Ga. 1980);
Rose, supra note 125.
130. See Tim Chitwood, In Final Appeals, Stocking Strangler Attorneys Say Ga. Is
About to Execute an Innocent Man, LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2018, 7:13 PM), https://
www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/local/article204962304.html [https://perma.cc/C56V-EY6P].
131. See Rose, supra note 125.
132. Georgia Rejects Clemency for a Killer Who Says He Is [Intellectually Disabled],
N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 31, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/31/us/georgia-rejects-clem
ency-for-a-killer-who-says-he-is-retarded.html [https://perma.cc/3MEY-N869].
133. See Hance v. Zant (Hance IV), 696 F.2d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 1983).
134. See Hance v. Kemp (Hance VII), 373 S.E.2d 184, 188 (Ga. 1988).
135. Id. at 187.
136. See id. at 187, 189.
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simultaneously excluded Black people from participation in city life.
Specifically, Muscogee county prosecutors prevented Black people
from serving on capital juries in cases involving Black men.137 Be-
tween 1973 and 1990, the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, in which
Muscogee County is located, sentenced twenty people to death, more
than any other judicial district in Georgia during this period.138 Assis-
tant District Attorney (ADA) William J. Smith prosecuted Mr. Hance’s
case.139 ADA Smith prosecuted four Black men for capital murder
during the 1975–1979 period.140 Across the four cases, ADA Smith
struck a total of twenty-five Black jurors.141 In three of these cases, he
struck every prospective Black juror, securing an all-White jury.142 The
State of Georgia set one of these formerly death-sentenced men free on
May 15, 2020, after DNA testing undermined the all-White jury’s 1977
conviction for the rape and murder of a White woman.143 In Mr.
Hance’s case, though two Black Muscogee residents sat on the jury,
DA Smith used ten of his preemptory strikes to remove Black venire
members.144 After trial, two of the ten White jurors admitted that they
referred to Mr. Hance using racial slurs during deliberations.145 No
Georgia state or federal court ever held a hearing on this issue.146
Muscogee County arrested, prosecuted, and tried Mr. Hance in
an atmosphere of racial terror. In his first trial, the county prosecu-
tor excluded Black people from Mr. Hance’s jury.147 In his second
trial, jurors admitted to using racial slurs during sentencing deliber-
ations.148 Mr. Hance’s first jury heard nothing to contextualize his
137. See Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, supra note 110,
at 5, 8.
138. Id. at 1–2; Chattahoochee Judicial District: BUCKLE OF THE DEATH BELT:
The Death Penalty in Microcosm, DEATHPENALTYINFO.CTR. (Jan. 1, 1991), https://death
penaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/in-depth/chattahoochee-judicial-district
-buckle-of-the-death-belt-the-death-penalty-in-microcosm [https://perma.cc/A72Y-YGED].
139. Hance v. State (Hance I), 268 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1980).
140. See Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, supra note 110,
at 5, 8–9.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1, 12; Bill Rankin, Georgia Man Freed After 43 Years for Crime He Denies
Committing, ATLANTA-J.CONST. (May 19, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia
-inmate-freed-after-years-for-crime-denies-committing/HbDs7WRjonj4I4AekOorhL [https://
perma.cc/BBK2-DV94].
144. See Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, supra note 110,
at 9.
145. See Hance v. Zant (Hance X), 511 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also Bright, supra note 113, at 855; Herbert, supra note 113.
146. See Chattahoochee Judicial District: BUCKLE OF THE DEATH BELT: The
Death Penalty in Microcosm, supra note 138.
147. Id.
148. See Hance X, 511 U.S. at 1014 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Bright, supra
note 113, at 855; Herbert, supra note 113.
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mental state at the time of the crime, his experience with sexual
trauma and relationship violence, or the legacy of racial terror in
Muscogee County, because his trial counsel presented no mitigating
evidence.149 After a federal court granted habeas relief, new counsel
represented Mr. Hance at a resentencing hearing.150 Counsel, des-
perate for a diagnosis, presented a mental health expert who, testi-
fying for the defense, offered a series of confusing and unflattering
medical labels; he characterized Mr. Hance as “incapable of having
empathy for others,” “ha[ving] a difficult time admitting he has done
something wrong,” and exhibiting “poor judgement.”151 Although Mr.
Hance’s post-conviction counsel did more to humanize their client
by submitting a mental health expert report that, for the first time,
drew connections between Mr. Hance’s trauma history and the
violence that he committed against Ms. Faison, this same report
characterized Mr. Hance as “impulsive . . . paranoid and argumenta-
tive . . . sullen, angry, demanding.”152 In short, the jury that sentenced
Mr. Hance to death in 1978 learned nothing about Mr. Hance’s life.153
The jury that resentenced him to death in 1985, and the state and
federal post-conviction courts reviewing his case in the following
years heard a lot about what was “wrong” with Mr. Hance, but they
heard very little about what happened to him and the trauma that
he experienced.154 No court ever afforded Mr. Hance an opportunity
to litigate his claim of racial bias in sentencing deliberations.155 The
State of Georgia executed Army and Marine Corps veteran William
Hance on March 31, 1994.156
149. See Hance v. Zant (Hance IV), 696 F.2d 940, 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1983); Hance v.
Kemp (Hance VII), 373 S.E.2d 184, 188–89 (Ga. 1988).
150. See Hance VII, 373 S.E.2d at 185–86, 189.
151. Id. at 187.
152. See Hance v. Zant (Hance IX), 981 F.2d 1180, 1185 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993).
153. See Hance v. State (Hance I), 268 S.E.2d 339, 342–43 (Ga. 1980).
154. See Hance VII, 373 S.E.2d at 186–89.
155. See Hance v. Zant (Hance X), 511 U.S. 1013, 1013–14 (1994).
156. See William Hance, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ex
ecutions/execution-database/231/william-hance [https://perma.cc/B52B-G5EP].
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D. Warren Hill, Jr.
157
In 1991, a Lee County jury sentenced Mr. Warren Hill, Jr. to
death for the killing of Joseph Handspike.158 Both men were serving
time at Lee State Prison and shared cells in close proximity to one
another.159 Immediately prior to the incident, Mr. Handspike made a
series of threats and sexual advances toward Mr. Hill.160 In close
quarters and with no meaningful opportunity for redress, Mr. Hill re-
acted violently to the threat of impending rape.161 Understanding Mr.
Hill’s response to this threat requires understanding his history of
intellectual disability, chronic physical abuse, sexual trauma, and the
stressors that he experienced while serving in the United States
Navy.162 The jury that sentenced Mr. Hill to death lacked access to
this information.163
Warren Hill, Jr. grew up between his grandparents’ and parents’
homes in Elberton and Hartwell, Georgia.164 His father drank heavily
and beat his mother when intoxicated.165 Ms. Hill took the children
to live with their grandparents when the violence became overwhelm-
ing.166 While the abuse impacted all of the Hill children, Warren,
who lived with an intellectual disability, exhibited a higher level of
distress.167 He often experienced seizures after witnessing one of his
parents’ violent arguments, sometimes requiring hospitalization.168
157. Image source: Georgia Resource Center.
158. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, Hill v. Terry (Hill VII), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74723 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2006) (No. 1:04-cv-00151).
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 5, 23–24, 56.
163. Id. at 6–8.
164. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 4.
165. Id. ¶ 3.
166. Id. ¶ 4.
167. Id. ¶¶ 9, 21.
168. Id. ¶¶ 24, 32; Scott Aff., supra note 37, ¶ 4.
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Both Warren’s mother and his grandfather targeted him for
physical and psychological abuse based on his disability.169 Warren’s
grandfather told him throughout his childhood that he would never
amount to anything and would likely end up in prison.170 When
Warren experienced stress-related seizures due to the violence in
his home, his grandfather beat him.171
Warren’s grandfather molested his sisters, and his siblings
believe that he molested Warren, too.172 At age twelve, a stranger
abducted Warren and his younger brothers, Chester and Mitchell,
and raped Chester in Warren’s presence.173
During the 1960s, Warren attended segregated schools in
Franklin County and Elbert County, Georgia.174 At the time, these
counties allocated few resources to the education of Black students.175
The schools that Mr. Hill attended lacked funds to provide individu-
alized instruction for students with disabilities.176
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the difficulties that he over-
came in childhood, Mr. Hill personally excelled in the Navy.177 He
enlisted in 1979, immediately after graduating high school.178 Mr.
Hill rose quickly through the ranks, achieving the rank of E5, Petty
Officer–Second Class.179 At a naval air station in Massachusetts, he
worked for an Aviation Ordinance (AO) squad tasked with loading
nuclear bombs and nuclear-tipped missiles onto aircraft.180 The Navy’s
rigid structure provided the stability and the social support system
that Mr. Hill lacked in childhood, enabling him to perform his job
well despite his disability.181 However, in the mid-1980s, when the
Navy transferred him to Naval Air Station Atlanta, close to home
and traumatic memories in Marietta, Georgia, Mr. Hill began to ex-
hibit signs of distress.182 After living with his mother for a short time,
he eventually moved in with a romantic partner, Myra Wright.183
Ms. Wright’s own struggles prevented her from being fully present
169. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 4.
170. Id. ¶ 14.
171. Id. ¶ 18.
172. Id. ¶ 19.
173. Id. ¶ 20.
174. Hicks Aff., supra note 36, ¶¶ 2–3; Porter Aff., supra note 36, ¶ 2.
175. Hicks Aff., supra note 36, ¶ 8; Porter Aff., supra note 36, ¶ 5.
176. Hicks Aff., supra note 36, ¶ 8,; Porter Aff., supra note 36, ¶ 5.
177. Hartsough Aff. ¶ 5–7, C.815–17, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003)
(on file with author).
178. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 27.
179. O’Bryant Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 13.
180. Id. ¶¶ 2, 8–9.
181. See id. ¶¶ 9–10.
182. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
183. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 29, 31.
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for Mr. Hill, and their relationship deteriorated.184 His work began
to suffer, and he received disciplinary citations for going AWOL
from the Navy base.185 For the first time since childhood, he experi-
enced seizures so severe that he required inpatient hospitalization,
once in 1984 and again in 1985.186 During these years, he expressed
feelings of severe depression, suicidality, and perceptions of reality
that others did not share.187 Kennestone Hospital in Marietta sub-
jected Mr. Hill to involuntary restraints during his stay there, further
exacerbating the traumatic impact of his mental health crisis.188
Ms. Wright left Mr. Hill almost immediately following his dis-
charge from Kennestone in 1984.189 The breakup devastated him.190
He grew increasingly depressed, and experienced a second, debilitat-
ing seizure in 1985.191 The Navy administered a battery of psycho-
logical tests to Mr. Hill in connection with this hospitalization, but it
failed to identify the factors contributing to his distress or to pro-
pose a plan for his recovery.192 The broken relationship with Myra
continued to dominate Mr. Hill’s thoughts.193 It was in this state of
untreated distress that Mr. Hill took Myra’s life, received a life sen-
tence and entered Lee State Prison, where he encountered Mr.
Joseph Handspike.194
The jury that sentenced Mr. Hill to death heard very little about
the trauma that he endured in childhood or the challenges that he
faced due to his intellectual disability; they heard nothing about his
experiences with sexual trauma—critical information for the jury to
appreciate in understanding his response to the threat of prison
rape.195 The sentencing jury also heard very little about Mr. Hill’s
184. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
185. See id. ¶¶ 33–34.
186. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.
187. See Duckworth Aff. ¶¶ 9–10, C.801–05, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613
(Ga. 2003) (on file with author); O’Bryant Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 17; Williams Aff., supra
note 38, ¶¶ 33, 35.
188. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶ 32.
189. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
190. Id. ¶ 33.
191. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.
192. Id. ¶ 38.
193. See id. ¶ 40.
194. Hill v. State, 351 S.E.2d 451, 452 (Ga. 1987); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
supra note 158, at 5.
195. See C. Hill Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 21–22; J. Hill Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 42–43; W.
Hill, Sr. Aff. ¶ 20, C.847–52, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003) (on file
with author); Scott Aff., supra note 37, ¶¶ 33–35; Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 43–45.
Mr. Hill’s siblings explained on post-conviction review that they wish they had disclosed
more information about their brother’s childhood at trial; at the time, they failed to ap-
preciate the power of such evidence to save their brother’s life. See C. Hill Aff., supra note
38, ¶¶ 21–22; J. Hill Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 42–43; W. Hill, Sr. Aff., supra, ¶ 20; Scott Aff.,
supra note 37, ¶¶ 33–35; Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 43–45.
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successful Navy service, and on post-conviction review, the State
attempted to use his military record to disprove his claim of intellec-
tual disability.196
One juror who voted for death disclosed on voir dire a past
history of sexual harassment, identifying the person responsible as
a young Black male with an intellectual disability.197 Despite this
admission, the court permitted her to serve as a juror in the capital
trial of a young Black man in a case involving threatened sexual
violence.198 On state habeas review, a second juror came forward
and renounced her death verdict; she claimed that she and other
members of the jury cried when sentencing Mr. Hill to death, that
they felt he “did not deserve to die,” and that, if she had access to
more information about Mr. Hill’s trauma history, she would have
chosen life.199
In the quarter century that he spent on death row, Mr. Hill
continued to litigate his Eighth Amendment right to protection from
execution based on intellectual disability, until the State of Georgia
executed him on January 15, 2015.200
196. See Duckworth Aff., supra note 187, ¶¶ 11, 13–14; Hartsough Aff., supra note
177, ¶¶ 5–8; O’Bryant Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 7–14, 18.
197. Trial Tr. at 302:11–303:25, Hill v. State, Lee County Superior Court Case No.
91R14 (August 2, 1991) (Hill I) (on file with author).
198. See id. at 303:7–303:25.
199. Mackey Aff. ¶¶ 4, 9–13, C. 939–44, Head v. Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga.
2003) (on file with author).
200. Warren Hill,DEATHPENALTY INFO.CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions
/execution-database/1399/warren-hill [https://perma.cc/UF29-YLSA]; see Hill VI, 587
S.E.2d at 617, 627.
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E. Travis Hittson
201
A Houston County jury sentenced Mr. Travis Hittson and his
co-defendant, Edward Vollmer, to death in 1993 for the murder of
Conway Utterbeck.202 All three men served in the United States Navy
and were assigned to the U.S.S. Forrestal, a ship docked in Pensacola,
Florida.203 In April 1992, the three took leave to enjoy a long week-
end at Mr. Vollmer’s family home in Warner Robins, Georgia.204 One
evening, Mr. Vollmer and Mr. Hittson returned home after a day of
drinking.205 Vollmer saw Mr. Utterback lying down and demanded
that Mr. Hittson attack him with a baseball bat.206 Mr. Vollmer out-
ranked Mr. Hittson on the Forrestal, serving as his direct supervi-
sor.207 Vollmer used his superior position to manipulate Mr. Hittson
by planning the murder and forcing Mr. Hittson to carry it out.208
201. Image source: Georgia Resource Center.
202. Hittson v. State (Hittson I), 449 S.E.2d 586, 590 n.1 (Ga. 1994).




207. ART CODY & KIRSTEN ANDREA SALCHOW, APPLICATION TO GEORGIA BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLES ON BEHALF OF TRAVIS CLINTON HITTSON 15 (2016), http://www
.pap.georgia.gov/document/document/here-14/download [https://perma.cc/V8VS-3G76].
208. Id. at 15, 20.
2021] FULFILLING PORTER’S PROMISE 789
The jury that sentenced Mr. Hittson to death learned nothing of
the ways that his family’s struggles with alcoholism, his exposure to
physical and emotional abuse, and his experiences of social margin-
alization impacted his development.209 The jury further lacked an
understanding of the ways that Mr. Hittson’s position in the hi-
erarchal structure of the Navy informed his participation in an act
of violence under the direction of a superior.210
Mr. Hittson’s experiences of abuse, neglect, and marginalization
in childhood left him especially eager to earn the approval of others
as an adult.211 Multiple generations of Mr. Hittson’s family struggled
with alcohol, and these struggles contributed to the chaotic environ-
ment in which Mr. Hittson grew up.212 His parents did not take care
of their family home, and they expressed more affection for their dogs
than they did for Mr. Hittson and his three siblings.213 Mr. Hittson’s
father became violent when drunk, and he singled out Travis for
abuse.214 Mr. Hittson, born prematurely, lived with a learning dis-
ability, and found it challenging to interact with his peers.215 As a
result of these difficulties, he experienced social exclusion at school.216
His parents failed to follow up on teachers’ recommendations that
they consider supportive learning services for their child.217
At age seventeen, Mr. Hittson enlisted with the Navy.218 The
military’s rigid structure and merit-based reward system presented
opportunities to win the approval of his peers, approval that he
never received during childhood.219 Those who served with him on
the Forrestal testified to his kind nature and the ways that he went
above and beyond what the Navy asked of him: babysitting ship-
mates’ children, bringing pizza to those assigned to stay on the ship
for twenty-four-hour shifts, and putting in extra time to master
required tasks.220 As his former superior Petty Officer Third Class
Bill Kimberlin explained:
209. See id. at 5–6.
210. See id. at 13–15.
211. See Shults Aff. ¶¶ 14–16, 21, C.1340–49, Hittson v. State (Hittson I), 449 S.E.2d 586
(Ga. 1994) (on file with author). The affidavit of Mary Shults, a social worker and defense
mitigation investigator, remains on file with the Georgia Supreme Court Clerk’s office.
212. CODY & SALCHOW, supra note 207, at 5–6.
213. Shults Aff., supra note 211, ¶¶ 17, 20.
214. Id. ¶ 14.
215. Id. ¶¶ 7, 15–16.
216. See id. ¶ 16.
217. Id. ¶ 15.
218. CODY & SALCHOW, supra note 207, at 8.
219. See id. at 8–10.
220. Id.
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I felt it was important to Travis to please me both as a supervisor
and as a friend. But Travis was the type of person so eager to
please it put him in a vulnerable position, such that he could be
swayed to do something he would not normally do on his own.221
Shortly before the date of the incident, the Navy transferred Petty
Officer Kimberlin to a new duty station and assigned Mr. Vollmer
to supervise Mr. Hittson.222 Mr. Hittson found the personnel change
stressful.223 His drinking, which began in adolescence, escalated to
dangerous levels, and he began to experience blackouts.224 Mr. Vollmer
took advantage of Mr. Hittson’s increasing vulnerability, forcing
him to run errands for him and to buy him cigarettes and alcohol.225
Mr. Hittson, known to never disobey the Navy chain of command,
obliged.226 It was in this vulnerable state that Mr. Hittson traveled to
Warner Robbins with Vollmer and Mr. Utterbeck and in this state
that Vollmer commanded Mr. Hittson to take Mr. Utterbeck’s life.227
Mr. Hittson’s trial counsel hired a social worker who specialized
in family therapy to investigate the environment in which Mr.
Hittson grew up, the difficulties that he experienced in childhood,
and the ways that these struggles impacted his time in the Navy and
his participation in the killing of Conway Utterbeck.228 At a pretrial
hearing, defense counsel proffered the social worker’s testimony.229
The court ruled that Mr. Hittson could not introduce her testimony
as mitigation without triggering the State’s right to present its own
psychiatric expert in rebuttal.230 To protect Mr. Hittson, trial coun-
sel withheld social worker Mary Shults’s testimony.231 Despite this
decision, the court permitted the State to introduce the testimony
of psychologist Dr. Robert J. Storms in rebuttal to lay witness testi-
mony.232 Dr. Storms characterized Mr. Hittson as completely devoid
of remorse, and the Houston County prosecutor relied on this testi-
mony during closing arguments.233 In fact, Mr. Hittson experienced
profound regret over the death of Conway Utterbeck; shipmates
221. Id. at 5.
222. Id. at 11–12.
223. See id. at 12.
224. CODY & SALCHOW, supra note 207, at 6, 11.
225. Id. at 17.
226. Id. at 13, 15, 17.
227. See id. at 19–20.
228. Shults Aff., supra note 211, ¶¶ 1–4.
229. Trial Tr. at 42:1–4, Hittson v. State, Houston County Superior Court Case (Ga.
Mar. 17, 1993) (on file with author).
230. Id. at 66:10–23.
231. See id. at 65:19–22.
232. Id. at 241:10–12, 20–21.
233. See id. at 242:5–6, 278:11–25.
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observed signs of increased drinking, severe depression, and social
withdrawal in the months following the incident.234 However, with
no mental health expert testimony to contextualize Mr. Hittson’s
trauma history, his participation in the crime, or the profound emo-
tional distress that he experienced following Mr. Utterbeck’s death,
Dr. Storms’s characterization powerfully influenced the jury’s vote
for death.235
Four jurors later renounced their death verdicts, pleading with
the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant clemency to Mr.
Hittson.236 The Board denied clemency, and the State of Georgia
executed Mr. Hittson on February 17, 2016.237
F. Brandon Jones
In 1979, Brandon Jones and Van Roosevelt Solomon participated
in the robbery of a gas station in suburban Atlanta.238 The station
employee, Roger Tackett, lost his life during the course of the rob-
bery.239 Evidence failed to establish which man fired the fatal shot.240
A Cobb County jury sentenced Mr. Jones to death for his participa-
tion in this crime.241 Today, Georgia juries almost never impose
death sentences in armed robbery cases.242
A federal court reversed Mr. Jones’s death sentence in 1989,
after finding a Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendment violation
where the trial court permitted jurors to keep a Bible with them in
the deliberation room.243 A second Cobb County jury resentenced Mr.
Jones to death in 1997.244 Neither jury heard about the ways that
physical and sexual abuse, racism, and inhumane prison conditions
234. CODY & SALCHOW, supra note 207, at 21–22.
235. See Hittson v. State (Hittson I), 449 S.E.2d 586, 590 (Ga. 1994); CODY & SALCHOW,
supra note 207, at 5–6, 21–22.
236. CODY & SALCHOW, supra note 207, at 4.
237. Travis Hittson, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execu
tions/execution-database/1429/travis-hittson [https://perma.cc/6FCB-9HVD].
238. Jones v. State (Jones I), 293 S.E.2d 708, 709–10 (Ga. 1982).
239. Id.
240. See id. at 714.
241. Id. at 709.
242. See GERALD W. KING, APPLICATION TO THE GEORGIA BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE ON BEHALF OF BRANDONASTORJONES 19 (2016), https://pap.georgia.gov/press-re
leases/2016-01-29/parole-board-has-declassified-clemency-application-brandon-astor
-jones [https://perma.cc/8DNA-W8TG]. Between 1995 and 2015, no jury imposed a death
sentence on facts similar to Mr. Jones’s case. Id.
243. Jones v. Kemp (Jones IV), 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1558, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
244. Jones v. State (Jones V), 539 S.E.2d 154, 157 (Ga. 2000) (affirming death sentence
on direct appeal).
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impacted Mr. Jones’s development through young adulthood.245 Nei-
ther jury learned that, after leaving prison, Mr. Jones joined the
Army to turn his life around.246 Jurors did not review reports from
an Army psychiatrist, reports that explained how Mr. Jones’s trau-
matic preservice experiences continued to affect him while in the
Army, resulting in a PTSD diagnosis.247 The jury further did not
learn that the military discharged him prematurely in response to
his mental health crisis, rather than referring him to supportive
services.248 Jurors never heard this information because Mr. Jones’s
trial and resentencing counsel lacked the trauma-informed mitiga-
tion approach necessary to uncover and present Mr. Jones’s narra-
tive.249 Faced with minimal mitigating evidence, Cobb County jurors
sentenced Mr. Jones to death twice in an armed robbery case in
which evidence failed to conclusively identify the shooter.250 The
punishment that the jury imposed on Mr. Jones for this crime stood
out as extreme given statewide sentencing patterns in similar
cases.251 The apparent disproportionality of sentencing in this case
begs consideration of the potential power of available mitigating
military and mental health evidence to produce a different outcome.252
Mr. Jones lived with his mother, Jessie Carter, in Chicago until
the age of five.253 In an effort to provide a better life for her son, Ms.
Carter sent him to live with his great aunt and uncle on a farm in
rural Illinois.254 Unbeknownst to his mother, Mr. Jones’s great uncle,
a Reverend, forced him to perform arduous labor on the farm and
mandated that he conform to strict religious rules.255 When Mr.
Jones broke a rule or failed to complete his chores, his great uncle
beat him.256 During the years that he lived with his great uncle, Mr.
245. Brief of Appellant at 24, Jones v. Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison Warden,
756 F.3d 1171 (11 Cir. 2014) (No. 11-14774) (on file with the author).
246. Id. at 33.
247. Id. at 33–39.
248. Id. at 34.
249. Id. at 2–3, 10–12.
250. See Jones v. State (Jones V), 539 S.E.2d 154, 157, 161 (Ga. 2000); KING, supra
note 242, at 12.
251. KING, supra note 242, at 16–17, 19 (noting that from 1975 to 2015, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed only 11 death sentences in armed robbery cases and all of these
sentencing decisions occurred prior to 1995). The death-sentencing rate in armed robbery
cases stands out as negligible when considering that, over roughly the same period, be-
tween 1972 and 2018, Georgia juries-imposed death sentences in nearly 300 cases. Excel
Document of Death Sentences in Georgia, 1972–2018 (on file with author).
252. See KING, supra note 242, at 5–14.
253. Id. at 28–29.
254. Id. at 29–30.
255. Brief of Appellant, supra note 245, at 26–28.
256. KING, supra note 242, at 29–30.
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Jones’s cousin molested him repeatedly.257 Mr. Jones’s great aunt
and uncle enrolled him in a newly integrated school in their rural
community.258 There, Mr. Jones, the school’s only Black student, con-
fronted racism daily at the hands of White peers and teachers, who
resented his arrival.259
Mr. Jones’s return to Chicago at the age of twelve provided no
greater sense of safety.260 Ms. Carter continued to struggle with al-
cohol, and the violence that dominated her romantic relationships
left her sons feeling unsafe.261 Mr. Jones and his brother took to the
streets to escape the chaos at home, leaving them vulnerable to arrest
at an early age.262 In 1958, fifteen-year-old Mr. Jones entered the State
Industrial School for Boys, a prison for youth in Sheridan, Illinois.263
He spent over one year incarcerated at Sheridan.264 While at Sheridan,
Mr. Jones survived brutal beatings at the hands of mostly White
prison guards, who targeted Mr. Jones based on his identity as a
young Black boy from Chicago.265 On multiple occasions, guards sent
him to Sheridan’s solitary confinement unit, where he spent anywhere
from one up to twenty-nine days in the facility’s “dungeon” with mini-
mal lighting and a restricted diet.266 Sheridan guards hurled racial
epithets at Mr. Jones and the other young Black boys in their custody,
as they assaulted them or sent them to the dungeon.267 In 1960, one
year after Mr. Jones’s release, the Illinois legislature commissioned
an investigation of the brutality and racism pervasive at Sheridan.268
The legislature’s report corroborated Mr. Jones’s own account of the
inhumane conditions there.269 The State of Illinois stopped using it
as a juvenile facility based on these findings.270
The abuse that Mr. Jones survived at Sheridan took its toll; he
emerged feeling “broken down inside,” unable to sleep, and discon-
nected from other people and sometimes from reality.271 He never
257. Id. at 29.




262. See KING, supra note 242, at 32.
263. Id. at 32.
264. Brief of Petitioner at 32, Jones v. Hall (Jones VII), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158913
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2011) (No. 1:09-CV-1228-CAP).
265. Id. at 32–33.
266. Id.
267. KING, supra note 242, at 32.
268. Id. at 33.
269. Id. at 32–33.
270. See Sheridan Correctional Center, ILL.DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://www2.illinois
.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/sheridancorrectionalcenter.aspx [https://perma.cc/9YJR-JUQM].
271. Brief of Appellant, supra note 245, at 32.
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received treatment for the psychological trauma that he endured
while incarcerated.272 Less than three years after his release from
Sheridan, Mr. Jones enlisted in the United States Army, making a
conscious decision to change the trajectory of his life.273
Mr. Jones spent less than one year in the army.274 The rigid
pattern of army life recalled his great uncle’s harsh authoritarian-
ism and the cruel conditions at Sheridan.275 In this environment,
Mr. Jones’s mental health began to deteriorate, and his performance
suffered.276 In 1963, Mr. Jones’s commanding officer noticed his dis-
tress and referred him for a psychiatric evaluation.277 Dr. Levon
Tashijan, a military psychiatrist, spoke with Mr. Jones about the
traumas that he experienced in his youth, gave him a diagnosis
consistent with PTSD, and he was administratively discharged from
the army.278 Three mental health experts who met with Mr. Jones in
2003, in preparation for state habeas proceedings, and each inde-
pendently concluded that he lived with chronic PTSD, corroborating
the 1963 army evaluation.279
Mr. Jones spent over three decades on death row before the
State of Georgia executed him in 2016.280 In prison, he became a pro-
lific writer, penning memoirs entitled “Warning! Our Children Under
Siege, and Why We Must Be There For Them!” and “An Obituary for
Brandon Astor Jones: Soon To Be Deceased.”281 In these writings,
Mr. Jones described what it was like to grow up in his mother’s home;
the physical, sexual, and psychological abuse he survived while living
with his great uncle; and the brutality and racism that he encountered
at Sheridan.282 Mr. Jones struggled to discuss these difficult experi-
ences with his trial and resentencing counsel when confronted di-
rectly.283 However, conscious of the power of his story, he mailed a
copy of his writings to resentencing counsel.284 Counsel never followed
up on these memoirs, and the Cobb County jury that sentenced Mr.
272. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 264, at 34.
273. See id. at 34.
274. See id. at 34–35.
275. Brief of Appellant, supra note 245, at 24–35.
276. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 264, at 35.
277. Id. at 34–35.
278. Id. at 34–36; cf. 10 U.S.C. § 1177(a)(1)–(2) (outlining the modern statute for admin-
istrative separation due to PTSD).
279. Brief of Appellant, supra note 245, at 35–39.
280. Jones v. State (Jones I), 293 S.E.2d 708, 709 (Ga. 1982); Brandon Jones, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution-database/1427
/brandon-jones [https://perma.cc/3QNP-BRW4].
281. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 264, at 17–18, 79 n.15.
282. Id. at 17–18, 20, 33.
283. See id. at 17.
284. See id.
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Jones to death for a second time in 1997 never learned the history
of the person that they condemned to die.285 The State of Georgia
executed Mr. Jones on February 3, 2016.286
G. Marcus Wellons
On August 31, 1989, military police located the body of fifteen-
year-old India Roberts in the woods near an apartment complex in
Cobb County, Georgia.287 In 1993, a Cobb County jury convicted
army veteran Marcus Wellons of raping and killing Ms. Roberts, a
close friend to his former partner’s fourteen-year-old son, Tony
Saunders.288 Mr. Wellons and Ms. Roberts lived in the same apart-
ment complex, and the tragedy occurred less than twenty-four hours
after Gail Saunders, Tony’s mother, declined Mr. Wellons’ marriage
proposal and ended their relationship.289 At the time of the arrest,
police found Mr. Wellons in a state of severe emotional distress.290
A pretrial ruling chilled Mr. Wellons’s ability to present evidence
of his trauma history, and the State used its peremptory strikes to
exclude Black people from the jury and to handpick White jurors
who endorsed discriminatory views about mental illness.291 This un-
representative group of jurors heard very little about Mr. Wellons’s
experiences with family trauma and the ways that these experiences
contributed to a state of emotional crisis following the painful end to
a romantic relationship.292 They heard little of Mr. Wellons’s honor-
able army service, his career as a counselor, or his desire to give
back to his family and community—all factors tending to frame the
crime that he committed as a tragic response to a crisis that recalled
prior family trauma.293 Predictably, this jury voted for death.294
Marcus Wellons grew up in Miami, Florida, in extreme pov-
erty.295 His family sometimes went without electricity and running
water.296 His father beat his wife and children.297 Mr. Wellons’s
285. Id. at 1–2, 18.
286. Brandon Jones, supra note 280.
287. Wellons v. State (Wellons II), 463 S.E.2d 868, 873–75 (Ga. 1995).
288. Id. at 873.
289. Id. at 873–75.
290. See id. at 875.
291. Brief of Appellant at 8, 39–40, Wellons v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification
Prison (Wellons X), 695 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-14935).
292. See id. at 4–6, 8.
293. See id. 5–6.
294. Wellons II, 463 S.E.2d at 873.
295. Brief of Appellant, supra note 291, at 4–5.
296. Id. at 4.
297. Id. at 4–5.
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exposure to the violence between his parents profoundly impacted
him.298 When he intervened to protect his mother, Mr. Wellons’s
father directed his anger toward his son, threatening him with a
gun and disclaiming him as a part of the family.299
Despite the challenges that Mr. Wellons experienced in child-
hood, he excelled as a young adult.300 He served in the United States
Army and earned an honorable discharge.301 Later, he became the
first in his family to graduate college and pursued a career as a
counselor.302 His own life experiences motivated him to make a posi-
tive impact in the lives of others dealing with similar challenges.303
When he and his partner Gail began to experience relationship dif-
ficulties, he sought counseling on his own initiative.304 Aware of the
traumatic impact of violence on families, he exerted great effort to
preserve his own.305
Police arrested Mr. Wellons in the midst of a mental health
crisis.306 When Gail rejected his proposal, he began drinking heavily
and acting out-of-character.307 He wrote a letter to Gail describing
his psychological state as “the worst [he had ever experienced] . . .
in his life.”308
ADA Jack Mallard, the Cobb County prosecutor assigned to Mr.
Wellons’s case, purposely excluded Black people from his jury.309
Aware that the defense intended to present mental health evidence
to contextualize Mr. Wellons’s state of mind at the time of the crime,
ADA Mallard seated White jurors who held discriminatory views
about mental illness.310 Two of these jurors expressed an inability
to consider mental health evidence.311
In a pretrial ruling at the State’s request, the Cobb County
Superior court erroneously ordered Mr. Wellons to turn over the
reports of any mental health experts consulted in preparation for
298. See id. at 5.
299. Id. at 4–5.
300. Id. at 5.
301. Brief of Appellant, supra note 291, at 5.
302. Id. at 5.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 5–6.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 4, 6–8.
307. Wellons v. State (Wellons II), 463 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ga. 1995); Brief of Appellant,
supra note 291, at 6.
308. Brief of Appellant, supra note 291, at 6.
309. Wellons II, 463 S.E.2d at 873, 877.
310. See id. at 877.
311. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 67, Wellons v. Head (Wellons V), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 116796 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2004) (No. 1:01-cv-01296).
2021] FULFILLING PORTER’S PROMISE 797
trial, whether or not he ultimately introduced their testimony.312 This
ruling prevented trial counsel from fully investigating his trauma
history and presenting this information to the jury.313 In summary,
the State of Georgia tried Marcus Wellons, a man charged with
murder committed in the midst of a mental health crisis, before a
panel of jurors who held discriminatory views about people with
mental illness and without affording him a meaningful opportunity
to present mental health mitigation.314
Mr. Wellons did present one expert psychologist at trial.315 In
his testimony, the psychologist characterized Mr. Wellons’s emo-
tional state at the time of the crime as a post-traumatic stress
response.316 In state habeas proceedings, two mental health experts
testified in further detail about the trauma that Mr. Wellons experi-
enced in childhood; they explained that he lived with PTSD and
contextualized the way that his experience with trauma related to
his actions on the night of August 30, 1989.317 Georgia courts denied
relief based on the new mental health evidence, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.318 Mr. Wellons litigated claims of discrimi-
natory jury selection for over two decades, but state and federal courts
ultimately denied relief.319 The State of Georgia executed army vet-
eran Marcus A. Wellons on June 17, 2014.320
II. BLACK GEORGIANS AND GEORGIANS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
FACE A HEIGHTENED RISK OF EXECUTION
Black Georgians face an elevated risk of execution due to the
death penalty’s historical relationship to chattel slavery and racial
terror. For Georgians with mental disabilities, heightened risk arises
due to the institution’s failure to accommodate for the unique needs
of these individuals. Due to the intersection of these two identities,
Black Georgians who live with mental disabilities face an especially
312. Id. at 11.
313. See id. at 5–6, 11.
314. See id. at 11, 67.
315. Wellons II, 463 S.E.2d at 876.
316. Id.
317. See Wellons v. Hall (Wellons VI), 554 F.3d 923, 927–28, 941–42 (11th Cir. 2009).
318. Wellons v. Turpin (Wellons IV), 534 U.S. 1001, 1001 (2001) (denying certiorari
review of rejection of state habeas claims related to mental health mitigation); see
Wellons VI, 554 F.3d at 932–33.
319. See Wellons v. Humphrey (Wellons XI), 571 U.S. 869, 869 (2013); Wellons IV, 534
U.S. at 1001; Wellons II, 463 S.E.2d at 877, 882.
320. Marcus Wellons, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execu
tions/execution-database/1380/marcus-wellons [https://perma.cc/3M6U-4MJD].
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heightened risk of execution.321 As the cases of the six Georgia veter-
ans from Part I illustrate, veteran status alone fails to insulate Black
Georgians and Georgians with mental disabilities from these risks.
A. Black Georgians Face a Heightened Risk of Execution
Georgia’s death penalty, as an institution, historically func-
tioned within a dual system of punishment designed to oppress both
free and enslaved Black people. The state’s modern death penalty
evolved as a de jure replacement for racial terror lynching.322 Today,
features of death penalty law, such as unchecked prosecutorial discre-
tion in charging decisions, weak enforcement of the right to a jury
of one’s peers, and an unwillingness to root out the role of racism in
capital jury deliberations, preserve the death penalty’s historic func-
tion as a racially biased institution.323
As amended in 1755, Georgia’s slave code classified all felonies
committed by enslaved Black people as crimes punishable by death.324
This scheme differed markedly from the hierarchy of punishments
applied to White Georgians.325 Black Georgians charged with murder
or the rape of a White woman faced automatic execution.326 White
people received a sentence of two to twenty years for the rape of a
White woman, and “[a] fine [and/or a term of] imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court” for identical sexual violence committed
against a Black woman.327
321. See GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 41, at 5, 39. Black people living with
mental disabilities also face legal marginalization in areas outside death penalty law.
See, e.g., Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 14, at 432–33, 435, 437–39, 441 (discussing how Black
people with mental disabilities confront racism in the mental health system through
experiencing misdiagnosis, substandard treatment, involuntary commitment, involuntary
administration of psychotropic medications, seclusion and restraint, and clinician/court
findings of dangerousness at higher rates than White people with identical disabilities).
322. See EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY
OF RACIAL TERROR 5 (2017). During the era of racial terror lynching, White state and
non-state actors in states like Georgia murdered Black people for violating the social codes
of segregation, developing relationships with White people, achieving economic success,
asserting their political rights, or demanding that White people treat them with respect.
See id. at 27, 29–31, 38–39. Black citizens accused of crimes also faced the threat of lynch-
ing, as White communities viewed the court system, with its constitutional protections,
as too good for Black people. See id. at 32. Finally, in some cases, White people lynched
entire families or friend groups to create a public spectacle intended to terrorize Black
communities. See id. at 38.
323. See id. at 63–64.
324. GLENN MCNAIR, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: SLAVES AND FREE BLACKS IN GEORGIA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 38–39 (2009).
325. See id. at 39–40.
326. Ga. Penal Code § 4704 (1861).
327. Id. § 4249.
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Between 1877 and 1950, Georgia ranked second in the nation
in number of racial terror lynchings.328 White Georgians executed
589 Black people during these years.329 By the time the Court de-
cided McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987, Georgia sentenced people to death
at a rate four times higher for killing White victims than for killing
Black victims.330 In 2019, researchers demonstrated that the State of
Georgia executes people at a rate seventeen times higher for killing
White victims than for killing Black victims.331
The data speaks for itself, documenting remarkable continuity
in Georgia’s use of extreme punishment as a tool to enforce racial
subordination.332 The McCleskey decision underscores the ways that
prosecutorial charging decisions and jury penalty-phase verdicts
sustain this system of racial targeting.333 In McCleskey, the Court
refused to intervene to prevent prosecutors from exercising their dis-
cretion to seek death in a way that targeted Black Georgians.334 More
recent Georgia cases highlight the law’s failure to protect Black
people from unrepresentative and racially biased juries.335
In the 2016 case of Foster v. Chatman, the prosecutor excluded
Black people from the jury that sentenced Mr. Timothy Tyrone Foster
to death in Floyd County, Georgia, citing membership in a histori-
cally Black church as a “race neutral” reason for the strikes.336 The
Supreme Court ultimately reversed, finding this explanation pre-
textual.337 In 2019, a Georgia trial court found that Muscogee County
prosecutors unconstitutionally excluded Black jurors in every death
penalty case involving a Black male between 1975 and 1979, secur-
ing all-White juries in six of seven cases during these years.338 The
same two Muscogee County prosecutors handled all seven of these
cases, excluding a total of forty-one prospective Black jurors over the
328. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 39–40.
329. Id. at 40.
330. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987); see also DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE
WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS vii, 316 (1990) (providing data that analyzes the death sen-
tences for murder in Georgia between 1973 and 1979).
331. Scott Phillips & Jason Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV.C.R.-C.L.L.REV.
585, 587 (2020) (discussing how researchers updated the Baldus study by examining the
same dataset of death-sentenced cases and finding that race-of-victim effects predicted
not only the likelihood of receiving a death sentence but also the likelihood of execution,
indicating that appellate review exacerbated, rather than remedied, racial disparities
at the trial phase).
332. See EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 65; Phillips & Marceau, supra
note 331, at 586.
333. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287–91.
334. Id. at 333–35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
335. See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742, 1744 (2016).
336. Id. at 1742, 1751, 1753.
337. Id. at 1742–43, 1753.
338. Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, supra note 110, at 5, 8.
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four-year period.339 In one case, the State excluded all four prospec-
tive Black jurors, and an all-White jury sentenced Mr. Johnny Lee
Gates, a Black man, to death.340 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
Mr. Gates a new trial in March 2020 based on exculpatory DNA evi-
dence.341 In May 2020, the State of Georgia consented to Mr. Gates’s
release from prison based on this evidence of innocence.342 He
walked free on May 15, 2020.343
Black Georgians face heightened risk that prosecutors will ex-
clude Black peers from their capital juries. They also face a risk that
White jurors will sentence them to death based on racist beliefs. A
Jones County, Georgia jury sentenced Mr. Keith Leroy Tharpe to
death for the 1990 killing of his former wife.344 Years later, a mem-
ber of that jury, Mr. Barney Gattie, disclosed to Mr. Tharpe’s defense
team the racism underlying his death vote.345 Mr. Gattie stated in
an affidavit, “‘[T]here are two types of Black people: 1. Black folks and
2. N[******]’ . . . Tharpe, . . . ‘wasn’t in the “good” [B]lack folks cate-
gory in [my] book, [and] should get the electric chair for what he
did.’”346 No federal or Georgia state court ever examined Mr. Tharpe’s
claim of juror bias on its merits, instead denying relief on procedural
grounds.347 Mr. Tharpe died on Georgia’s death row on January 24,
2020, less than a year after the Supreme Court declined to review
his case.348
The juror exclusion and juror bias cases cited above demonstrate
the ways that racial discrimination continues to pervade Georgia’s
death penalty system. Each of the Black Georgia veterans introduced
here likewise faced an elevated risk of execution due to discriminatory
jury selection and juror bias. For example, ADA William Smith, the
Muscogee county prosecutor handling Mr. Hance’s case, used ten of
his eleven peremptory strikes to remove Black people from his
jury.349 Cobb County prosecutor Jack Mallard similarly exercised
peremptory strikes to remove Black people from Marcus Wellons’s
339. Id. at 8–9.
340. Id. at 9–10, 12.
341. State v. Gates, 840 S.E.2d 437, 456 (Ga. 2020) (upholding Muscogee County
Superior Court’s order granting extraordinary motion for new trial).
342. Rankin, supra note 143.
343. Id.
344. Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E. 2d 78, 79, 82 (Ga. 1992).
345. Tharpe v. Ford, 19 S. Ct. 911, 912 (2019).
346. Id. at 911.
347. Id. at 912.
348. Id. at 911; Man Sentenced to Death by Juror Who Questioned if ‘Black People
Even Have Souls’ Dies on Georgia’s Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO.CTR. (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/man-sentenced-to-death-by-juror-who-questioned-if
-black-people-even-have-souls-dies-on-georgias-death-row [https://perma.cc/F53F-DCAN].
349. See Order on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, supra note 110,
at 9.
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jury, strategically seating White jurors who expressed discrimina-
tory views about mental illness.350 A juror who disclosed on voir dire
that she “[had a] problem with young [B]lack men” sat on the panel
that sentenced Mr. Warren Hill to death.351 Two jurors who voted to
condemn Mr. William Hance later admitted that they referred to
Mr. Hance using racial slurs during deliberations.352
As these cases illustrate, capitally charged Black Georgians face
enhanced risks in a legal system historically designed and procedur-
ally maintained to enforce racial subordination. Veteran status
alone does not nullify these risks, especially in cases—like those of
the four Black veterans examined in this Article—where counsel
fails to present evidence of military service at trial. Protecting Black
veterans from execution therefore requires defense counsel to adopt
strategies responsive to the heightened risk that these veterans
face: investigating with cultural humility; exploring the impact of
racism and racial trauma on a person’s life story, including their ex-
perience in the military; and remaining vigilant against the State’s
attempts to deprive Black veterans of the right to a jury comprised
of their peers.
B. Georgians with Mental Disabilities Face a Heightened Risk of
Execution
Georgia’s death penalty places Black Georgians at risk due to
the institution’s historical function as a tool of racial subordination.
Georgia’s death penalty also places individuals with mental disabili-
ties at risk, due to the system’s failure to accommodate the unique
needs and experiences of these individuals.
Over 70% of people support exempting individuals with SMI
from the death penalty.353 Despite widespread opposition to execut-
ing these individuals, they remain overrepresented on death rows
across America, including Georgia’s.354 Of the 824 individuals exe-
cuted nationwide between 2000 and 2015, over 42% exhibited signs
of mental illness.355 Around 13.4% showed signs of major depression,
350. Wellons v. State (Wellons II), 463 S.E.2d 868, 873, 877 (Ga. 1995).
351. Trial Tr. 302:19–20, Hill v. State (Hill I), Lee Cnty. Superior Ct. Case No. 91R14
(August 2, 1991) (on file with author).
352. See Bright, supra note 113, at 855; Herbert, supra note 113.
353. AM. BAR ASS’N DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REV. PROJECT, SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 6 (2016), http://www.amnestyhouston.org/uploads
/1/5/9/9/15993000/american_bar_associaton_-_severe_mental_illness___deathpenalty
__2016_.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8XN-HGWJ].
354. See Baumgartner et al., supra note 44.
355. Id.
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14.4% experienced suicidality and 10.07% previously attempted sui-
cide, 4.5% lived with schizophrenia, 3.9% experienced Bipolar disor-
der, and 5.8% exhibited signs of PTSD.356 Over 10% spent time in a
psychiatric hospital before receiving a death sentence.357 Many re-
ported histories of severe childhood trauma—with over 26.2% re-
porting physical abuse, 12.5% reporting sexual abuse, 16% reporting
neglect, and 7.8% reporting general abuse.358 Approximately 7.5%
gave up their legal appeals and volunteered for execution.359
The State of Georgia executed 36 people between October 2001
and December 2015.360 Twenty of these individuals, or 56%, demon-
strated signs of mental illness.361 Specifically, six lived with depres-
sion, two with schizophrenia, one with bipolar disorder, and five
with PTSD.362 Seven experienced suicidality.363 Six survived psychi-
atric hospitalization prior to receiving a death sentence.364 Many
came to death row with histories of severe trauma: fifteen experi-
enced physical abuse, six survived sexual abuse, and four reported
childhood neglect.365 During the 2001 to 2015 period, Georgia exe-
cuted three veterans who shared these experiences: Warren Hill
(childhood physical and sexual trauma and an intellectual disabil-
ity), Andrew Brannan (bipolar disorder and PTSD), and Marcus
Wellons (PTSD and physical abuse in childhood).366
Why do individuals with mental illness face enhanced risk of
execution if most people support exempting them from the death
penalty? One reason is that the structure of capital trials makes it
difficult for people with mental disabilities to present their stories
in a way that humanizes them. Specifically, four discrete challenges
impact the ability of individuals to present mental health mitigation
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial: (i) capitally charged people
with mental disabilities experience difficulty exposing painful, trau-
matic memories; (ii) prosecutors frequently exclude individuals with
experience of mental illness from capital juries; (iii) adversarial
356. Frank R. Baumgartner, Marty Davidson, Kaneesha R. Johnson, Arvind
Krishnamurthy & Colin P. Wilson with Betsy Neill, Mental Health, in DEADLY JUSTICE:
A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE DEATH PENALTY 244, 256 (2017).
357. Baumgartner et al., supra note 44.
358. Id.
359. Baumgartner et al., supra note 356, at 64–65.









366. Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 3, 19; Baumgartner et al., supra note 44.
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capital prosecutions activate stereotypes about mental illness and
violence; and (iv) forensic mental health experts often pathologize,
rather than humanize, defendants with mental illness.367 Respon-
sive mental health mitigation requires that defense counsel recog-
nize these risks and structure mitigation strategy accordingly.
The Constitution entitles individuals with mental disabilities
to present evidence of their experiences with mental disabilities
when pleading with a jury to vote for life, and jurors find such evi-
dence compelling.368 The cases of the six Georgia men presented here
bear witness to the power of mental health mitigation. In the case
of Mr. Warren Hill, for example, jurors did not hear evidence of the
chronic physical and sexual abuse that he experienced at home.369
In an affidavit submitted in support of state post-conviction relief,
one member of the Lee County jury that sentenced Mr. Hill to death
explained that she and several other jurors cried during delibera-
tions because they did not feel that Mr. Hill was “one of those
type[s] [of] criminals that deserved to be put to death[;]” and that,
if presented evidence of Mr. Hill’s trauma history, she would have
chosen life.370 As a first step, defense counsel must acknowledge the
mitigating potential of mental health evidence and its presentation
as part of a person’s narrative.
Second, defense counsel must possess an understanding of
trauma and the risk of re-traumatization, and they must adopt a
trauma-informed mitigation strategy. Although jurors in capital cases
find mental health evidence powerful, uncovering and presenting this
evidence requires a person to reveal and make public painful, trig-
gering, and stigmatizing memories and experiences. Many people
with SMI and other mental disabilities do not identify with their di-
agnoses, and may not inform counsel of their mental health history.371
Others, witnessing the mental health stigma prevalent in the world
around them, learn to survive by concealing their disabilities.372
367. See Baumgartner et al., supra note 356, at 235, 240, 260.
368. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1203, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing
how Georgia petitioner Eric Lynn Ferrell entitled to present evidence of, inter alia, child-
hood trauma, family history of mental illness, intellectual disability, organic frontal lobe
brain damage, epilepsy, bipolar disorder, and suicidality to the jury who sentenced him
to death).
369. See Williams Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 3, 19, 43–45.
370. Mackey Aff., supra note 199, ¶¶ 1, 4, 9–10, 12–13.
371. See Ragins & Pollack, supra note 16, at 386.
372. See THEICARUSPROJECT, MADNESS AND OPPRESSION:PATHS TO PERSONALTRANS-
FORMATION AND COLLECTIVE LIBERATION 1–3 (2015), http://nycicarus.org/images/Mad
nessAndOppressionGuide-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4789-XM2H] (providing a guide
for psychiatric survivors to name and respond to their experiences of societal stigma);
Brian Watermeyer & Tristan Görgens, Disability and Internalized Oppression, in IN-
TERNALIZED OPPRESSION: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARGINALIZATION 253, 263–65 (E.J.R.
David ed., 2014) (explaining the general theory of internalized oppression); see also
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Additionally, traumatic experiences profoundly impact memory,
making it challenging to share painful past experiences with defense
counsel.373 Further, trauma that occurs in the home impacts all
members of the family, making it difficult for a person’s loved ones to
discuss these painful memories with defense counsel.374 When a
loved one faces a death sentence, family members likewise experience
trauma and face stigma in their communities.375 Family members
may find it easier to share positive memories about their relative in
an effort to protect the person and the family from shame and to avoid
re-traumatization.376 Put simply, capital trials place individuals with
mental disabilities, and their loved ones, in a position in which their
lives depend on their ability to share things about themselves that
may be difficult or impossible to reveal publicly. The six cases profiled
here include illustrations of the ways that trauma complicates col-
laboration with individuals and their families around mental health
mitigation. For example, Georgia army veteran Brandon Jones found
it difficult to discuss with trial counsel the pervasive physical and
sexual abuse he endured in childhood and the way that past experi-
ences of solitary confinement impacted his mental health, but he
wrote prolifically about these events in his memoirs.377 The jury that
sentenced him to death never heard about these experiences.378 Simi-
larly, on post-conviction review, Mr. Warren Hill’s siblings submitted
affidavits expressing their regret that they did not introduce jurors to
their brother’s experiences with childhood abuse, and the marginaliza-
tion that he endured as a result of his intellectual disability.379
Katherine C. Cunningham & Alicia Lucksted, Social Cognition, Internalized Stigma, and
Recovery Orientation Among Adults with Serious Mental Illness, 40 PSYCHIATRICREHAB.
J. 409, 409–11 (2017) (finding that internalized societal stigma serves as a barrier for
some people with SMI who pursue recovery).
373. STEPHEN BRIGHT, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN GEORGIA
4 (1993) (“Victims of trauma, particularly in childhood, experience a phenomenon known
as memory blocking. Blocking is a coping mechanism that allows continued functioning
in the face of psychologically and physically threatening abuse and trauma. It is for this
reason that the client may be a poor historian: memories are simply blocked out.”);
BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, Uncovering Secrets: The Problem of Traumatic Memory, in THE
BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA (2015);
BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, The Unbearable Heaviness of Remembering, in THE BODY KEEPS
THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA (2015).
374. See BRIGHT, supra note 373, at 5.
375. See TEX. AFTER VIOLENCE PROJECT, NOBODY TO TALK TO: BARRIERS TO MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT FOR FAMILY MEMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO DEATH OR
EXECUTED 22–23 (2019), https://texasafterviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/TAVP
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/47NG-KQ3N].
376. See BRIGHT, supra note 373, at 5.
377. See Jones v. Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison Warden (Jones IX), 753 F.3d
1171, 1180–81 (2014).
378. See id. at 1174, 1180.
379. See, e.g., C. Hill Aff., supra note 38, ¶¶ 5–6, 11, 21–22.
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Third, defense counsel must seek to seat jurors with a personal
familiarity with mental disability, while also structuring advocacy
to reach an audience that lacks exposure to these issues. This is
because prosecutors routinely exclude individuals with experiences
of mental disability from capital juries.380 Although the Constitution
prohibits prosecutors from excluding jurors based on race or gender,
these protections do not apply to people with disabilities.381 Accord-
ingly, no legal protections exist to prevent prosecutors from striking
people based on a personal history of mental disability or a close re-
lationship to someone with a mental disability.382 The six cases cited
here bear out this pattern. In Andrew Brannan’s case, the prosecutor
struck a mental health nurse who worked with patients experienc-
ing PTSD as well as a twenty-one-year veteran of the United States
Marine Corps, who served in Vietnam alongside other service mem-
bers who later developed combat PTSD.383 ADA Jack Mallard, who
prosecuted Mr. Marcus Wellons’s case, knew that the defense in-
tended to introduce mitigating evidence of his trauma history and
deteriorating mental state at the time of the crime.384 The ADA ex-
cluded Black people from the jury, strategically seating White jurors
who expressed discriminatory views about mental illness.385
Finally, defense counsel must anticipate the State’s attempt to
use mental health evidence in aggravation, so they must think
critically when selecting a mental health expert and orienting that
person to the case. The adversarial nature of capital trials makes it
difficult to present mental health evidence in a way that engenders
empathy rather than fear. Capital sentencing trials pit defense coun-
sel, arguing for life, against the State, arguing for death. Both sides
present mental health expert testimony; the defense expert explains
that the person’s experience with SMI mitigates responsibility for the
charged crime, while the State’s expert characterizes an individual’s
SMI as untreatable and likely to lead to future violence. Each side
offers a conflicting, difficult-to-understand diagnosis, which often leads
to juror confusion. The Georgia prosecutor and the State psychiatrist
claim that the defendant “faked” SMI to avoid a death sentence, that
380. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163(b)(3) (2020).
381. See Epps v. United States, No. 2:12-CV-13-RWS-JCF, No. 2:06-CR-28-RWS-JCF
-1, 2013 WL 1490979, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2013) (rejecting Mr. Azim Waleed Epps’s
argument that the court should extend Batson to disability and upholding prosecutor’s
strike of the sole Black juror in the venire based on disability); Jones v. State, 548 S.E.2d
75, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that constitutional protection against discrimination in
jury selection does not extend to disability and permitting prosecutor to strike hearing-
impaired Black juror because disability was a “race-neutral” reason for exclusion).
382. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163(b)(3) (2020).
383. Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561 S.E.2d 414, 422 (Ga. 2002).
384. See Wellons v. State (Wellons II), 463 S.E.2d 868, 873, 875–76 (Ga. 1995).
385. Id. at 877.
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he is “untreatable,” and that he will commit more violence if allowed
to live. The jury may never learn how SMI impacts the person on a
daily basis.386 Capital jurors in trials presenting issues of SMI en-
counter evidence of a horrible crime alongside evidence of mental
illness. Prosecutors encourage jurors to make sense of this evidence
by relying on stereotypes linking SMI to violence.387 These argu-
ments place Black people with SMI at elevated risk given the soci-
etal myths associating both Black men and individuals with mental
illness with violence.388 Additionally, popular imagery of veterans
living with combat PTSD as “trained killers” places former service
members at grave risk when attempting to present mitigating mental
health evidence at trial.389 The cases of army veterans Andrew H.
386. See Marla Sandys, Heather Pruss & Sara M. Walsh, Capital Jurors, Mental
Illness, and the Unreliability Principle: Can Capital Jurors Comprehend and Account for
Evidence of Mental Illness?, 36 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 470, 479, 483–84 (2018) (interviewing
205 jurors who served in 63 capital cases in which mental illness emerged as a key issue
and the researchers found that the “battle of the experts” led jurors to mistrust and
dismiss defense mental health expert testimony).
387. See id. at 480–81 (revealing that prosecutors focus, in capital trials, on the aggra-
vated nature of a crime to “eclipse serious consideration” of a defendant’s mental health
and attempt to activate stereotypes linking mental illness to violence).
388. See, e.g.,JONATHAN M.METZL, PROTEST PSYCHOSIS:HOWSCHIZOPHRENIABECAME
A BLACK DISEASE 207 (2009) (analyzing the ways in which negative beliefs about schizo-
phrenic violence came from racial discrimination and psychiatry pathologizing Black
men); see also Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 14, at 432–33, 437–41 (explaining that Black
people with mental disabilities are overdiagnosed with schizophrenia; more frequently
subject to involuntary commitment, involuntary administration of antipsychotics, seclusion
and restraint; and clinicians are more likely to perceive Black people with mental dis-
abilities as “dangerous” than White people with identical disabilities).
389. See Brief for Ga. Mil. Officers Ass’n, supra note 76, at 13, 15 (“Military training
includes psychological conditioning to enable a soldier to fire a weapon at another human
under certain circumstances. While such training is essential to success in combat,
where the ability to accurately evaluate circumstances and judge a perceived threat are
later derailed by a psychological condition, such as severe PTSD, this conditioning may
contribute to violent or aggressive behavior . . . For the vast majority of soldiers, the
training to react and fire quickly and accurately does not lead to unlawful behavior,
probably because this training to kill comes with an equally strict training to follow orders,
including conditioning for the discipline to fire only when ordered to do so. However, for
the portion of front-line combat veterans suffering from PTSD who exhibit aggression
and violent behavior, an understanding of military training is integral to understanding
the veteran’s behavior.”); W. Chris Jordan, Conditioned to Kill: Volition, Combat Related
PTSD, and the Insanity Defense—Providing a Uniform Test for Uniformed Trauma, 16
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 27–28 (2019) (“Through the application of highly effective
military training, combat veterans have been conditioned to kill and respond to threats
with violence . . . The perception of threats to their lives and the lives of their friends,
accompanied by the application of violence during exposure to war, causes PTSD in
many veterans. Veterans who develop PTSD on deployment return home with altered
brain chemistry, predisposing some to respond to threats with violence, and this altered
brain chemistry is sensitive to many stimuli. When a veteran with PTSD encounters
these stimuli, or stressors, the veteran may recall the original trauma—combat—causing
the brain to release chemicals which can lead the veteran to revert to skills and
functions conditioned during training . . . [T]he threats of civilian life, while much
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Brannan, William Hance, and Travis Hittson illustrate the short-
comings of mental health mitigation in adversarial capital prosecu-
tions.390 In each man’s case, the State and/or a mental health expert
presented a representation of mental disability that alienated the
jury.391 In Mr. Brannan’s case, the Laurens County prosecutor argued
both that Mr. Brannan faked his combat PTSD and that his military
experience made him a threat to others at GDCP:
Does Andrew Brannan need to be sentenced to life in the peni-
tentiary so he’ll have a lifetime of laying in his bunk at night
and breaking apart razors and figuring out some way when a
deputy walks up or a jailer walks up that he can take him one of
these razor blades and do some slashing? . . . Andrew Brannan
is a dangerous man. He’s murdered one deputy sheriff and it won’t
be hard for a combat-trained veteran to . . . do it again . . . you can
put him in there and those guards and those prisoners, they are
going to have to be living with him. And when he doesn’t like the
way something’s going, he waits and he strikes.392
Mr. Brannan’s trial counsel failed to meaningfully rebut the
prosecutor’s inflammatory statements, leaving the image of Andrew
Brannan as a trained killer to stand uncontested in the eyes of the
jury.393 Similarly, Mr. William Hance’s counsel, desperate for a
different, are nonetheless capable of triggering the physiological effects that lead to the
dissociative states and flashbacks inherent in PTSD.”).
390. See Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561 S.E.2d 414, 428 (Ga. 2002); Hance v. Zant
(Hance IX), 981 F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 1993); Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d
1210, 1237–41 (11th Cir. 2014).
391. See Brannan II, 561 S.E.2d at 428; Hance IX, 981 F.2d at 1184–85; Hittson, 759
F.3d at 1237–41.
392. Brief of Cross-Appellant, supra note 97, at 45, 48–49.
393. Brief of Ga. Mil. Officers Ass’n, supra note 76, at 19, 26 (“At his habeas hearing
in the Superior Court, Brannan established that others who served with him in Vietnam
were available and willing to testify on his behalf, but his trial counsel never asked them
to do so. Instead, at the sentencing phase, defense counsel relied upon the defendant’s
mother to introduce, but not explain, some records of defendant’s military history.
Counsel also referenced expert witness testimony from the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial concerning Brannan’s PTSD in which psychologists described some of Brannan’s
combat experiences. Significantly, each of these witnesses ultimately relied upon the
defendant’s account of what happened in Vietnam, making their testimony susceptible
to an attack on the defendant’s credibility . . . Had Brannan’s counsel performed a
sufficient investigation and called Brannan’s comrades to testify, the jury would have
heard first-hand accounts of Brannan’s front-line combat experience. For example, the
jury would have heard of how Brannan was a Lieutenant who led a five-man reconnais-
sance team, serving as an artillery forward observer, tracking the location of the enemy,
and used a radio to call in grid coordinates. The jury would have also heard first-hand
accounts of the traumatic events leading to Brannan’s PTSD, such as the horror and
haunting details of the patrol in which the company commander stepped on a land mine.
A fellow veteran’s graphic description of the land mine event and his statement that ‘I
can still remember the smell of [the Captain’s] burning flesh,’ would have distinguished
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diagnosis, hired experts who presented a series of unflattering psy-
chiatric diagnoses that portrayed him as subhuman.394 In Mr.
Hittson’s case, a trial judge issued a ruling that effectively prevented
him from introducing the testimony of a licensed social worker and
family therapist that was supposed to contextualize the ways that
the chaotic, abusive environment in which he grew up informed his
participation in the crime charged.395 The trial court permitted the
State psychiatrist to testify that Mr. Hittson lacked remorse, without
ever affording Mr. Hittson an opportunity to rebut this testimony.396
The dangers that people with mental disabilities face during a
capital trial in Georgia—the pressure to disclose painful memories
and experiences, the exclusion of peers with mental disabilities from
capital juries, the adversarial proceedings that promote the use of
stereotypes, and the expert testimony that confuses and alienates
rather than humanizes—place these people at a higher risk of ex-
ecution. As the six cases summarized above illustrate, veteran status
alone fails to protect people with mental disabilities from the death
penalty. This is especially true where trial counsel fails to present
mitigation that integrates a veteran’s experience with mental dis-
ability into a full narrative of his or her service history.
III. PORTER PROMISES PROTECTION FOR BLACK VETERANS
AND VETERANS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Granting Mr. George Porter relief merely required the Court to
apply well-established ineffective assistance of counsel precedent.
Strickland v. Washington and its progeny ask very little of capital
defense counsel, setting the bar for performance quite low.397 George
Porter’s trial counsel presented no evidence of his life history or
military service to the Florida court.398 In such an egregious case,
the Court overturned Mr. Porter’s death sentence without creating
a new rule of constitutional law.399
Brannan’s trauma from the problems that the prosecutor argued we all have. It also
would have served as a strong antidote to the prosecutor’s argument that, despite a VA
classification as 100 percent disabled, Andrew Brannan was a malingerer who ‘had to
work’ to get his disability.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
394. See Hance IX, 981 F.2d at 1184, 1185 n.6.
395. Hittson, 759 F.3d at 1241–42, 1245–46.
396. Id. at 1124.
397. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 693–95 (1984). At the turn of the
twenty-firstt century, applying Strickland, the Court decided a series of cases clarifying
requirements for competent mitigation representation. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 395–98 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522–25 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374, 380–86 (2005). The Porter decision followed these developments. See Porter
v. McCollum (Porter II), 558 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2009).
398. Porter II, 558 U.S. at 33.
399. Id. at 44.
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That Porter did not create new law does not nullify its power as
a tool for counsel representing veterans at risk of execution. The power
of Porter arises more from the Court’s reasoning, than from its ruling:
It is unreasonable to discount to irrelevance the evidence of [Mr.]
Porter’s abusive childhood, especially when that kind of history
may have particular salience for a jury evaluating Porter’s be-
havior in his relationship with Williams. It is also unreasonable
to conclude that [Mr.] Porter’s military service would be reduced
to “inconsequential proportions,” simply because the jury would
also have learned that Porter went AWOL on more than one
occasion. Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency
to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those
who fought on the front lines as [Mr.] Porter did. Moreover, the
relevance of [Mr.] Porter’s extensive combat experience is not only
that he served honorably under extreme hardship and gruesome
conditions, but also that the jury might find mitigating the intense
stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on [Mr.]
Porter. The evidence that he was AWOL is consistent with this
theory of mitigation and does not impeach or diminish the evidence
of his service. To conclude otherwise reflects a failure to engage
with what [Mr.] Porter actually went through in Korea.400
The Porter Court engaged fully with Mr. Porter’s childhood
trauma and his experiences with mental disability as well as the
bravery that he demonstrated on the battlefield.401 The Court ac-
knowledged his less-than-perfect service record and the fact that his
mental health deteriorated after he returned home.402 After review-
ing his entire life history, the Court concluded that the country owed
Mr. Porter respect and, more impactfully in a legal sense, protection
against execution.403
An analysis of state and federal case law fails to establish Porter’s
power to protect veterans from execution at the post-conviction stage.
Only two Georgia Supreme Court cases between November 30, 2009,
the date of the Porter decision, and October 2020, the time of this writ-
ing, cite to Porter.404 Both raised state habeas claims for relief based
on ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court denied relief to
both men.405 Neither case involved a veteran petitioner.406 Georgia
400. Id. at 43–44 (internal citation omitted).
401. See id. at 33–37.
402. See id. at 35–36.
403. See id. at 42–44.
404. See Sears v. Humphrey, 751 S.E.2d 365, 381 (Ga. 2013); Hall v. Lance, 687 S.E.2d
809, 812, 816, 818 (Ga. 2010).
405. Sears, 751 S.E.2d at 368; Hall, 687 S.E.2d at 813–16.
406. See Sears, 751 S.E.2d at 367–69; Hall, 687 S.E.2d at 811.
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federal district courts cite Porter in seventeen unreported decisions
and one published decision between November 2009 and October
2020.407 In 2017, the Northern District of Georgia granted habeas
relief to veteran petitioner Lawrence Jefferson, based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.408 However, the decision focused on trial coun-
sel’s failure to present evidence of organic brain damage, and no-
where referenced Mr. Jefferson’s service in the United States
Navy.409 In a second case, the Southern District denied relief to
Jimmy Meders.410 Five years later, in January 2020, the Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles granted clemency to Mr. Meders, rely-
ing in part on his seven years of service in the U.S. National Guard.411
407. See Butts v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, No. 5:13-CV-194,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140874, at *102, *111–12 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2015); Cook v. Upton,
No. 5:09-CV-25, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25290, at *39–40 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2010);
Esposito v. Humphrey, No. 5:12-CV-163, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170476, at *15 (M.D. Ga.
Dec. 10, 2014); Fults v. Upton, No. 3:09-CV-86-TWT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34150, at
*25 n.8 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2012); Gissendaner v. Seabolt, No. 1:09-CV-69-TWT, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39248, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2012); Hittson v. Humphrey, No. 5:01-
CV-384, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161727, at *136 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2012) (granting
habeas corpus petition in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Hittson v. GDCP
Warden, 759 F.3d 1210 (2014); Jones v. Chatman, No. CV502-116, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169525, at *56–59 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2019); King v. Warden, No. CV-2:12-119, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12317, at *46–49 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2020); Lee v. Upton, No. 5:10-CV-17,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152145, at *14–15 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2017); Lucas v. Upton, No.
5:09-CV-289, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41049, at *12 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013); McKinney
v. Jarriel, No. CV409-091, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113916, at *35–36 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 8,
2010); Meders v. Chatman, No. CV 207-90, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113816, at *43 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 14, 2014), aff’d, Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 900 F.3d 1330 (11th
Cir. 2018); Meders v. Chatman, No. 207-90, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126847, at *14 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 22, 2015), aff’d, Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 900 F.3d 1330 (11th
Cir. 2018); Pye v. Chatman, No. 3:13-CV-0119-TCB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240421, at
*71–72 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2018); Sears v. Sellers, No. 1:10-CV-1983-WSD, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86901, at *60, *66–67 (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2018); Tharpe v. Humphrey, No.
5:10-CV-433, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28438, at *9–10, *50, *52–53 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 6,
2014); Wilson v. Humphrey, No. 5:10-CV-489, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178241, at *43–44,
*48, *126–27, *160 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2013); Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340,
1371 (N.D. Ga. 2017), aff’d, Jefferson v. GDCP Warden, 941 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 2019).
408. Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1386–87 (N.D. Ga. 2017), aff’d,
Jefferson v. GDCP Warden, 941 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 2019).
409. Id. at 1372–74; see also Psychological Report: Lawrence Jefferson, C. 367, Jefferson
v. State, 353 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1987) (explaining during an interview with a forensic
psychologist that he [Mr. Jefferson] enlisted in the Navy to send money home to his
mother and to help send his younger sisters to school).
410. Meders v. Chatman, No. CV 207-90, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126847, at *16 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 22, 2015), aff’d, Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 900 F.3d 1330 (11th
Cir. 2018).
411. MICHAEL ADMIRAND, APPLICATION TO THE GEORGIA BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLES ON BEHALF OF JIMMY MEDERS at 11–14 (2020), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo
.org/documents/Jimmy-Meders-Georgia-Pardons-and-Paroles-Clemency-Application.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4C4-R4RK]; Parole Board Grants Clemency To Jimmy Fletcher Meders,
GA. STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://pap.georgia.gov/press-re
leases/2020-01-16/parole-board-grants-clemency-jimmy-fletcher-meders [https://perma
.cc/N4J7-5CVX].
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In the remaining fifteen cases, federal courts denied habeas relief.412
The Eleventh Circuit cited Porter in twenty-six appellate decisions
in cases originating from Georgia between November 2009 and
October 2020.413 The appellate court granted habeas relief on an
ineffective assistance claim in only two of these cases and affirmed
the lower court’s decision to grant relief in one other case.414 Neither
case granting new relief involved a veteran petitioner.415 None of the
412. Butts v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, No. 5:13-CV-194, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140874, at *176 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2015); Cook v. Upton, No. 5:09-CV-
25, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25290, at *79–80 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2010); Esposito v.
Humphrey, No. 5:12-CV-163, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170476, at *123 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 10,
2014); Fults v. Upton, No. 3:09-CV-86-TWT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34150, at *60 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 14, 2012); Gissendaner v. Seabolt, No. 1:09-CV-69-TWT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39248, at *72 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2012); Hittson v. Humphrey, No. 5:01-CV-384, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161727, at *183–84 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2012) (granting habeas corpus
petition in part and denying petition in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Hittson
v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210 (2014); Jones v. Chatman, No. CV502-116, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 169525, at *151 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2019); King v. Warden, No. CV-2:12-119,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12317, at *120 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2020); Lee v. Upton, No. 5:10-
CV-17, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152145, at *50–51 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2017); Lucas v.
Upton, No. 5:09-CV-289, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41049, at *121 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013);
McKinney v. Jarriel, No. CV409-091, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113916, at *57 (S.D. Ga.
Oct. 8, 2010); Pye v. Chatman, No. 3:13-CV-0119-TCB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240421,
at *120 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2018); Sears v. Sellers, No. 1:10-CV-19830WSD, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86901, at *142 (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2018); Tharpe v. Humphrey, No. 5:10-CV-
433, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28438, at *78 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2014); Wilson v. Humphrey,
No. 5:10-CV-489, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178241, at *192 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2013).
413. See Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2013); Conner v.
Hall, 645 F.3d 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1229 (11th Cir.
2011); Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2016); Lance v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 706 F. App’x 565, 574 (11th Cir. 2017); Cromartie v. GDCP Warden,
No. 17-12627-P, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 37224, at *25, *27–29, *33 (11th Cir. Mar. 26,
2018); Tollete v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 816 F. App’x 361, 367 (11th Cir. 2020);
Aldridge v. Crickmar, 680 F. App’x 809, 812 (11th Cir. 2017); Brannan v. GDCP Warden,
541 F. App’x 901, 906–07 (11th Cir. 2013); Lawler v. Warden, 631 F. App’x 905, 908 (11th
Cir. 2015); Hall v. Warden, Lee Arrendale State Prison, 686 F. App’x 671, 678 (11th Cir.
2017); Cook v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 677 F.3d 1133, 1141 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012);
Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 898 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018); Morrow
v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 886 F.3d 1138, 1150 (11th Cir. 2018); Franks v. GDCP
Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1185 (11th Cir. 2020); Jones v. Ga. Diagnostic & Classification
Prison Warden, 753 F.3d 1171, 1194 n.5 (11th Cir. 2014); Conner v. GDCP Warden, 784
F.3d 752, 761 (11th Cir. 2015); Nejad v. Att’y Gen., Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir.
2016); Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013); Wilson v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 774 F.3d 671, 679 (11th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Upton, 615 F.3d
1318, 1331, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2010); Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d
1230, 1272, 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2012); Jefferson v. GDCP Warden, 941 F.3d 452, 485
(11th Cir. 2019); Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.
2016); Butts v. GDCP Warden, 850 F.3d 1201, 1243, 1246–47 (11th Cir. 2017); Sealey v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020).
414. Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011); Hall v. Warden, Lee
Arrendale State Prison, 686 F. App’x 671, 685 (11th Cir. 2017); Jefferson v. GDCP
Warden, 941 F.3d 452, 487 (11th Cir. 2019).
415. See Hall v. Warden, Lee Arrendale State Prison, 686 F. App’x 671, 673–74 (11th
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six veterans profiled in this Article obtained post-conviction relief
based on Porter. Considering the foregoing, Porter’s power as a post-
conviction tool appears untested at best. This says more about the
petitioner-hostile nature of capital habeas law than it does about
the limitations of the Porter decision.416
Many death-sentenced veterans share stories similar to George
Porter’s. This Article introduces readers to six such stories of men
sentenced to death and executed in the state of Georgia. As the Court’s
language establishes, the Porter decision exists primarily for men
such as these—men whose military service intersects with life-course
experiences of marginalization based on race and/or mental disabil-
ity.417 These veterans face elevated risk at the capital trial stage418
and difficulty in obtaining post-conviction relief, as the Georgia and
Eleventh Circuit case law applying Porter demonstrates.419 To protect
these veterans from execution, Porter calls on trial counsel to adopt
mitigation strategies responsive to the heightened risk of execution
facing Black veterans and veterans with mental disabilities. Doing
so requires cultural humility, an empathetic and person-centered
approach to investigating mental disability, and a comprehensive
investigation of military service that incorporates review of active
duty and VA records as well as interviews with fellow service mem-
bers and former commanding officers.420 Only with such an inte-
grated approach would the capital jury learn the full story of an
Andrew Brannan, a William Hance, a Warren Hill, a Travis Hittson,
a Brandon Jones, or a Marcus Wellons.
Cir. 2017); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1203–06 (11th Cir. 2011). In a third case, the
court reversed a state court denial of relief based on Atkins, but it declined to review the
petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. See Conner v. Hall, 645 F.3d 1277, 1292–94
(11th Cir. 2011). This case also did not involve a veteran petitioner. See id. at 1280.
416. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(e). As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, the federal habeas statute makes it virtually impossible for
a habeas petitioner to obtain relief in federal court after a state court issues a denial. Id.
417. See Porter v. McCollum (Porter II), 558 U.S. 30, 42–44 (2009).
418. See supra Part II.
419. See, e.g., Sears v. Humphrey, 751 S.E.2d 365, 381 (Ga. 2013).
420. See, e.g., Alexis Hoag, Senior Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Presentation
at the Post-Conviction Capital Defense Training Program of the New York City Bar
Association Committee on Capital Punishment: Developing Race-Based Mitigation
Evidence and Cultural Competency in Post-Conviction Proceedings (June 25 2018); Sean
Bolser, Presentation to the Federal Defenders of New York: Signs and Symptoms: Identify-
ing and Investigating Mental Illness (Spring 2018); Art Cody, Presentation to the Legal
Aid Society of New York: Developing Your Veteran Client’s Narrative (Apr. 24, 2018).
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APPENDIX I: RECORD EXCERPTS
Andrew Brannan
Quote Citation
For the first time since Vietnam I can imag-
ine myself living beyond the next month.
C. 001746,
Brannan II
I would like to spend all of my time out in
the woods by myself. I feel peaceful when
I’m not around people . . . . Now, I don’t go
anywhere. I come out here, take care of my
folks and go out in the woods. I was in Viet-
nam from June 1970 to June 1971 with the
America Division I was a forward observer
with the Infantry. I was a first lieutenant.
Do I dwell on it now?
C. 001773–74,
Brannan II
I feel survival guilt because I was an officer.
I isolate to prevent myself from feeling the
need to take charge of others.
C. 002134,
Brannan II
I had a hard time over the weekend. When I
got back I was so anxious I felt out of breath.
I couldn’t catch my breath. All the way back
I was thinking about how the country had
abused me. It’s like being an abused child. I
still love it but I’m so hurt because I was




Constant thoughts of Vietnam cause a de-
crease in concentration, making a job situa-
tion extremely stressful. Unable to interact
interpersonally with others. Feels he will
never have a relationship due to low self-
esteem and severe anxiety. Feels he needs to
isolate to protect himself from this anxiety
and feels different and detached from others.
Recalls several incidents where he numbed
himself during critical events in
Vietnam—e.g. fire fights, deaths of friends,
killing of enemy . . .
C. 002202,
Brannan II
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Quote Citation
I am the son of a career officer. In fact, our
family provided four males for military ser-
vice. Three served in Vietnam, all officers, of
which my father and I are the only survivors
and I suffer with PTSD . . . I now realize I
was suffering with PTSD then but thought it
a burden soldiers carried for their country. I
have struggled with my PTSD for a long
time and my concern now is my parents who
are in their old age [and] do not deserve to
suffer due to my struggle.
C. 002594,
Brannan II
I have suffered with PTSD since my return
from Vietnam, believing it to be a burden
soldiers bare for their country . . . I was only
able to exist by the kindness of my family
and friends . . . I am doing the best I can
under the nature of my disorder.
C. 002605,
Brannan II
Upon my request for treatment at the VAMC
it was six weeks until my appointment at the
Mental Health Clinic on 06-06-89. Unable to
retreat to my isolation for protection, know-
ing my family had carried the burden of my
care for too long and unable to maintain nor
find more stable employment, I slipped into
a deep state of depression.
C. 002605,
Brannan II
My parents took me in. My father is a 30-
year career officer, a lieutenant colonel, and




I was given a 10% disability [in 1985]. But
I’m mad about the whole situation. I don’t
think the American people have accepted
their responsibility to the Vietnam veteran.
Why have more veterans committed suicide
than were killed in Vietnam? We’ve never
received the recognition we deserve.
C. 002615–16,
Brannan II
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Quote Citation
You may be interested to know I had one
brother who killed himself [in 1984]. He was
a Vietnam veteran. I had another brother
who was in the military who was killed in a
plane accident. I’m the only living son. And I
guess my father has learned to accept me,
learned to appreciate the difference between
being a World War II veteran and a Vietnam
veteran. You see, the World War II veteran
fought a clean, noble war, and they sent




I do have one persistent flashback, one per-
sistent dream . . . we were on a mission . . .
and the captain stepped on a land mine. I
had to go help him. I can still see him. He
had a leg blown off. He was practically
blown to pieces. Of course, he didn’t live.
That’s something that’s with me always . . . .
C. 002615–16,
Brannan II
I guess I didn’t want to face up to the fact
that I had a problem. I’m very proud, from a
military family. We’ve always done duty by
our country, and perhaps I feel that I have




My father is a retired LTC. He was in WWII,
Vietnam, had a younger brother in Vietnam.
They did their duty. My father has always
looked down on us from Vietnam. His atti-
tude has always been we were soldiers, this
was our job, and it’s all in the past. But I
can’t say that’s true for me . . . . He never
tried to know me, to understand my feelings.
He called me a boy; I’m a man. When I was
21 I commanded 200 soldiers. So I just went
into a deep depression . . . .
C. 002626–28,
Brannan II
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Quote Citation
About two months ago my other brother
killed himself . . . I guess this started all of
us thinking, that maybe there was
something wrong with me. I’ve never wanted
to admit it. I finally faced up to it and applied
for help from the Veterans Administra-
tion . . . I don’t want to be classified as a
mental problem volunteer; I’m proud, I sim-
ply haven’t been able to cope with a job . . . I
don’t want to be a burden, I want to be self-
supporting, but 12 or 13 years later, I’m not.
C. 002626–28,
Brannan II
I feel guilty about this whole Vietnam situa-
tion. I feel like I could have done something,
should have done something more . . . I feel
guilty at leaving combat because I know
other fellows were killed in my place . . . I
remember one instance where I almost
killed a wounded Vietnamese. I’m so glad I




Even when I’m walking in the woods I’m
looking for the Viet Cong, long over my




I was an officer. I was in charge of men,
sending them to death, and the country be-
trayed them, that’s what hurts.
C. 002626–28,
Brannan II
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Warren Hill
Quote Citation
He’s very limited, but he’s got a lot of
heart. He was willing to follow rules in
the Navy, and probably in school too. He
pretty much behaved and did what the
teachers told him to and didn’t create
problems. And so he did adequately. He
maximized his intellectual potential. In
the Navy, apparently, same kind of
thing. He had fairly low scores to get
into the Navy, but yet, when you look at
his military records, there were some
pretty good commendations. He was
promoted and there are some written
commendations in there about he was a
good example to the other seamen. He
was never a behavior problem. He be-
haved himself, much like he apparently
did in school. so he’s got limited abilities,
but he’s able to maximize them by basi-
cally not being a problem.




I wish that I had been asked about
Junior’s [disability], and about the abuse
he suffered. I wish that I had been told
what was important for the jury to know
about Junior.
C. 818–31, Hill VI
(affidavit of Peggy
Williams, sister)
Junior grew up around a lot of fighting. I
feel like he saw a lot of bad things from
me and Joan when he was coming up
and it affected him some way. He saw a
lot of meanness and violence. I wish I
could go back and do things over so that
he didn’t have to live through that. But I
guess you can never go back.
C. 847–52, Hill VI
(affidavit of Warren
Lee Hill, Sr., fa-
ther)
As we were growing up, I always felt
protective of Warren, and I looked out
for him . . . Warren looked to me to be a
mom for him in a lot of ways, because
our mother had a lot on her hands with
10 children and a violent, alcoholic
husband.
C. 860–71, Hill VI
(affidavit of Robbie
Scott, half-sister)
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Quote Citation
My little brother Warren was beaten
almost every other day all through child-
hood and teenage years, until he left to
join the Navy in 1979. He told me once
that he thought of the Navy as a way to
escape.
C. 860–71, Hill VII
(affidavit of Robbie
Scott, half-sister)
I did not feel that Mr. Hill was one of
those type of criminals that deserved to
be put to death . . . I, along with many
other jurors, cried when we voted to put
Mr. Hill to death.
C. 939–44, Hill VI
(affidavit of Jean
Mackey, juror) 
The lay person sees [intellectual disabil-
ity] perhaps as the Downs child, or some-
one who is pretty severely [disabled], has
a severe deficit. And many mildly [intel-
lectually disabled] people are able to,
again, find an environment in which
they can be reasonably successful. And
the image of the military is, for most
people, the recruitment posters and mov-
ies. And as we know, as those who have
served know, that isn’t always the way it
is, and it is possible for somebody to get
on a uniform and show up on time and
stay neat and make it, grow up, up to a
certain level.
Tr. 222, Hill VI
(testimony of Dr.
Stonefeld, M.D.)
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Quote Citation
You try to find where the strengths and
weaknesses are, and you try to build an
environment that will not let those
weaknesses let that person fail . . . so
you try to give them an environment
where they can use their strengths suc-
cessfully and where their weaknesses
won’t handicap them . . . In some respects
[the military] is ideal, in that it is highly
structured, highly repetitive for a person
who is trained to do a very narrow seg-
ment of whatever his job description is,
like refueling, or armament loading or
something. It is very repetitive. In the
military we say, when you teach you say,
tell them what you are going to say, say
it, tell them what you said, and then do
it again if you have to. And so it is an
over and over and over and over again,
and then walk through, and then hands
on, and then more supervision, and then
another walk through, and just over and
over until it is second nature, so to
speak. Very little is dependent on read-
ing a book or figuring anything out.
There are checklists, there are places to
sign off, supervisors sign off. It is really
kind of-enlisted ranks, lower levels are
really kind of an ideal situation for a
person who has marginal IQ.
Tr. 228–30, Hill VI
(testimony of Dr.
Stonefeld, M.D.).
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Travis Hittson
Quote Citation
The Hittsons raised dogs and Travis
was very jealous of the fact that his
father was more interested in the dogs
than him.
C. 1340–49, Hittson I
There was no evidence of any family
activities, no cohesion or centralization
in the family. There was a lack of nur-
turing and love and an emotional void
in the family. It appears as if most of
the family members were numb or
numbed themselves with alcohol or
drugs. The only vivid expressions of
emotion occurred when Mr. Hittson
was drunk and emotionally abused
Travis.
C. 1340–49, Hittson I
On one occasion, when family
counseling was an option, Mr. Hittson
stated that he knew his son better
than anybody and that he would not
participate in counseling. Even now,
when their son was facing a death sen-
tence, they were unengaged, showed no
emotion, and failed to acknowledge any
understanding of their failures and the
difficulties Travis encountered as a
result.
C. 1340–49, Hittson I
Neither of the parents showed a great
deal of interest or engagement in
Travis’ fate . . . they both showed very
flat affect, no warmth, and never cried
or acknowledged any strong emotions
in spite of the fact that their son had
been charged with a gruesome murder
and was facing capital punishment.
C. 1340–49, Hittson I
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Quote Citation
There are a couple of systems that let
this boy down, and I think he fell
through the cracks, and I think he was
at risk . . . At risk of harm, to himself,
to his health, to his development, by
the use of alcohol, and it was
untreated; it’s unchecked. There were
agencies that knew about it, as well as
family, and nobody would do anything.
I think he was at risk a long time ago.
He had accidents. He wanted so much,
Judge, to please his friends and to be
accepted. There are reports of him eat-
ing worms and, you know, doing things
that were not healthy for him, that,
you know, was real strange. He
just—needed to belong.
C. 1340–49, Hittson I
822 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:765
APPENDIX II: CASE PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
Andrew Brannan
• Laurens County jury sentences Mr. Brannan to death.
Brannan v. State (Brannan I), Laurens Super. Ct. Case No. 98-
FE-438-T (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 2000).
• The Georgia Supreme Court affirms the death sentence.
Brannan v. State (Brannan II), 561 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. 2002).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Brannan v. Georgia
(Brannan III), 537 U.S. 1021 (2002).
• The Butts Superior Court grants state habeas relief.
Brannan v. Hall (Brannan IV), Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No.
2003-V-408 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2008).
• The Georgia Supreme Court reverses, reinstating Mr.
Brannan’s death sentence. Hall v. Brannan (Brannan V),
670 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. 2008).
• The Southern District of Georgia denies federal habeas
relief. Brannan v. Humphrey (Brannan VI), No. 3:09-cv-00041
-DHB (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2012).
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Brannan v. GDCP Warden
(Brannan VII), 541 F. App’x 901 (11th Cir. 2013).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Brannan v. Humphrey
(Brannan VIII), 134 S. Ct. 2732 (2014).
• January 2, 2015: Laurens County Superior Court sets execution
date for January 13–20, 2015.
• January 12, 2015: Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles denies
clemency.
• Butts Superior Court denies state habeas relief. Brannan
v. Chatman (Brannan IX), No. 2015-HC-1, 2015 Ga. Super.
LEXIS 5710 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2015).
• Georgia Supreme Court denies motion for stay of execu-
tion. Brannan v. Chatman (Brannan X), No. S15W0734 (Ga.
Jan. 13, 2015).
• Supreme Court denies stay of execution. Brannan v.
Chatman (Brannan XI), 135 S. Ct. 1038 (2015).
• January 13, 2015: State of Georgia executes Andrew Brannan.
Andrew Brannan,DEATH PENALTY INFO.CTR., https://deathpen
altyinfo.org/executions/execution-database/1395/andrew
-brannan [https://perma.cc/XV9B-4ZCG].
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William Hance
• The Georgia Supreme Court affirms Mr. Hance’s death
sentence on direct appeal. Hance v. State (Hance I), 268
S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1980).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari.
Hance v. Georgia (Hance II), 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
• The Butts County Superior Court denies habeas relief,
and the Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hance v. Zant
(Hance III), 456 U.S. 965 (1982).
• The Eleventh Circuit grants federal habeas relief. Hance
v. Zant (Hance IV), 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1983).
• A Muscogee County jury resentences Mr. Hance to death,
and the Georgia Supreme Court affirms the second death
sentence. Hance v. State (Hance V), 332 S.E.2d 287 (Ga. 1985).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hance v. Georgia
(Hance VI), 474 U.S. 1038 (1985).
• The Butts County Superior Court denies state habeas
relief, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirms. Hance
v. Kemp (Hance VII), 373 S.E.2d 184 (Ga. 1988).
• The Middle District of Georgia denies federal habeas
relief. Hance v. Zant (Hance VIII), No. 4:89 cv 00085 HL
(M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 1991).
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Hance v. Zant (Hance IX), 981
F.2d 1180 (1993).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari.
Hance v. Zant (Hance X), 511 U.S. 1013 (1994).
• March 31, 1994: The State of Georgia executes William Hance.




• A Lee County jury sentences Mr. Hill to death. Hill v.
State (Hill I), Lee Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 91R14 (Aug. 2, 1991).
• The Georgia Supreme Court affirms. Hill v. State (Hill II),
427 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 1993).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hill
v. Georgia (Hill III), 510 U.S. 950 (1993).
• The Butts Superior Court denies state habeas relief. Hill
v. Head (Hill IV), Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 1994-V-216
(Ga. Super. Ct. May 13, 2002).
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• The Butts Superior Court reverses denial of habeas
relief for a jury determination of intellectual disability
in consideration of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Hill v. Head (Hill
V), Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 1994-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Nov. 19, 2002).
• The Georgia Supreme Court reverses, denying Mr. Hill
a jury trial on the issue of intellectual disability. Head v.
Hill (Hill VI), 587 S.E. 2d 613 (Ga. 2003).
• The Middle District of Georgia denies federal habeas
relief. Hill v. Schofield (Hill VII), No. 1:04 cv 00151 WLS
(M.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2007).
• The Eleventh Circuit reverses. Hill v. Schofield (Hill VIII),
608 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010).
• On rehearing, an en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit
reverses its decision in Hill VIII, reinstating the district
court’s denial of relief. Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IX), 662 F.3d
1335 (11th Cir. 2011).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hill
v. Humphrey (Hill X), 566 U.S. 1041 (2012).
• The Butts Superior Court again denies state habeas
relief. Hill XI, Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 2012-V-658 (Ga.
Super. Ct. July 19, 2012).
• The Georgia Supreme Court grants a stay of execution
based on issues with Georgia’s lethal injection protocol.
Hill v. Owen (Hill XII), Case No. S12W1812 (Ga. July 23, 2012).
The Georgia Supreme Court vacates the stay. Hill v. Owen
(Hill XIII), 738 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 2013).
• The Georgia Supreme Court declines to review Georgia
trial court’s denial of second state habeas petition, based
on new intellectual disability evidence. Hill v. Humphrey
(Hill XIV), Case No. S13W0825 (Ga. Feb. 19, 2013).
• The Middle District of Georgia denies leave to file a
second federal habeas petition, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirms. In re Hill (Hill XV), 715 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 2013).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hill
v. Humphrey (Hill XVI), 134 S. Ct. 115 (2013).
• The Lee County Superior Court denies state habeas
petition filed based on Hall v Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
Hill v. Chatman (Hill XVII), Lee Cnty. Super. Ct, Case No.
2014-SU-HC-6-TW (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2014).
• The Eleventh Circuit denies federal habeas relief based
on Hall. In re Hill (Hill XVIII), 777 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2015).
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• January 27, 2015: The State of Georgia executes Warren Hill.




• The Georgia Supreme Court affirms Mr. Hittson’s death
sentence on direct appeal. Hittson v. State (Hittson I), 449
S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1994).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hittson v. Georgia
(Hittson II), 514 U.S. 1129 (1995).
• The Butts County Superior Court denies state habeas
relief, and the Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hittson
v. Turpin (Hittson III), 532 U.S. 1052 (2001).
• The Butts County Superior Court denies state habeas
relief. Hittson v. Terry (Hittson IV), Civil Action No. 2005-V
-615 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005).
• On remand from the Georgia Supreme Court, the Butts
County Superior Court again denies state habeas relief.
Hittson v. Hall (Hittson V), Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No.
2005-V-615 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 1, 2009).
• The Georgia Supreme Court declines to review denial of
relief. Hittson v. Hall (Hittson VI), Case No. S09E1294 (Ga.
Oct. 18, 2010).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hittson v. Humphrey
(Hittson VII), 564 U.S. 1026 (2011).
• The Middle District of Georgia grants federal habeas
relief. Hittson v. Humphrey (Hittson VIII), No. 5:01-CV-384,
2012 WL 5497808 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2012).
• The Eleventh Circuit reverses. Hittson v. GDCP Warden
(Hittson IX), 759 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2014).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Hittson v. Chatman
(Hittson X), 135 S. Ct. 2126 (2015).
• The Cobb County Superior Court issues an execution
warrant. State v. Hittson (Hittson XI), No. 92-C-18076-M, 2016
Ga. Super. LEXIS 2028 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2016).
• February 16, 2016: The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles
denies clemency.
• The Georgia Supreme Court denies a stay of execution.
Hittson v. Chatman (Hittson XII), Case No. S16W0863 (Ga.
Feb. 17, 2016).
826 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:765
• The Supreme Court denies a stay of execution. Hittson v.
Chatman (Hittson XIII), 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
• February 17, 2016: The State of Georgia executes Travis Hittson.




• The Butts County Superior Court denies state habeas
relief, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirms. Jones v.
Francis (Jones II), 312 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. 1984).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari.
Jones v. Francis (Jones III), 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
• The Northern District of Georgia grants federal habeas
relief. Jones v. Kemp (Jones IV), 706 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga.
1989).
• A second Cobb County jury resentences Mr. Jones to
death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirms. Jones v.
State (Jones V), 539 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 2000).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Jones v. Georgia
(Jones VI), 534 U.S. 839 (2001).
• The Butts County Superior Court denies state habeas
relief. Jones v. Terry (Jones VII), Butts Cnty. Super. Ct. Case
No. 2002-V-79 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2006).
• The Northern District of Georgia denies federal habeas
relief. Jones v. Hall (Jones VII), No. 1:09-CV-1228-CAP, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158913 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2011).
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Jones v. GDCP Warden (Jones
IX), 753 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2014).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Jones v. Chatman
(Jones X), 136 S. Ct. 43 (2015).
• The Northern District of Georgia denies challenge to
state’s lethal injection protocol. Jones v. Bryson (Jones XI),
No. 1:15-CV-4445-CAP, 2016 WL 7486189 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21,
2016).
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Jones v. GDCP Comm’r (Jones
XII), 811 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2016).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Jones v. Bryson, 136
S. Ct. 998 (2016).
• February 3, 2016: State of Georgia executes Brandon Jones.
Brandon Jones, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpen
altyinfo.org/executions/execution-database/1427/brandon-jones
[https://perma.cc/3QNP-BRW4].
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Marcus Wellons
• A Cobb County jury sentences Mr. Wellons to death.
Wellons v. State (Wellons I), Cobb Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No.
914048 (Ga. Super. Ct. June 8, 1993).
• The Georgia Supreme Court affirms on direct appeal.
Wellons v. State (Wellons II), 463 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 1995).
• The United States Supreme Court denies certiorari.
Wellons v. Georgia (Wellons III), 519 U.S. 830 (1996).
• Butts County Superior Court denies petition for state
habeas relief, the Georgia Supreme Court declines re-
view, and the Court denies certiorari. Wellons v. Turpin
(Wellons IV), 534 U.S. 1001 (2001).
• The Northern District of Georgia denies federal habeas
relief. Wellons v. Head (Wellons V), No. 1:01 cv 01296 WBH
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2007).
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Wellons v. Hall (Wellons VI),
554 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2009).
• The Supreme Court vacates Wellons VI, remanding to the
Eleventh Circuit with instructions to remand to the North-
ern District. Wellons v. Hall (Wellons VII), 558 U.S. 220 (2010).
• The Eleventh Circuit remands to the district court.
Wellons v. Hall (Wellons VIII), 603 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).
• The Northern District denies habeas relief. Wellons v. Head
(Wellons IX), No. 1:01 cv 01296 WBH (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2007.
• The Eleventh Circuit affirms. Wellons v. Warden (Wellons
X), 695 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2012).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Wellons v. Humphrey
(Wellons XI), 571 U.S. 869 (2013).
• The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles denies clem-
ency. PAROLE BOARD DENIES CLEMENCY FOR MARCUS
WELLONS (June 16, 2014).
• Federal courts deny Mr. Wellons’ challenge to Georgia’s
execution protocol. Wellons v. Owens (Wellons XII), No. 1:14
-CV-1827-WBH, 2014 WL 12524653(N.D. Ga. June 16, 2014).
• The Eleventh Circuit denies a stay of execution. Wellons
v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr. (Wellons XIII), 754 F.3d 1260
(11th Cir. 2014).
• The Supreme Court denies certiorari. Wellons v. Owens,
573 U.S. 928 (2014).
• June 17, 2014: The State of Georgia executes Marcus Wellons.
Marcus Wellons, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpen
altyinfo.org/executions/execution-database/1380/marcus-wellons
[https://perma.cc/3M6U-4MJD].
